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Abstract 
We investigate the investor-manager relationship in a partial equilibrium 
principal agent model. The industry for the delegated portfolio management is 
characterized by information asymmetry on many different levels. Investors will 
have inferior knowledge on the alpha generating ability of a specific manager 
and the work he puts into his ex-ante analyses or in some cases the gross return 
generated. Existing literature confirms that there is a large variation mechanism 
design can be explained through agency frictions caused by uncertainty related 
to expectations of active management. Our approach internalizes both frictions 
caused by unobservability of the output and uncertainty related to the quality of 
the asset manager. We find that screening is more likely to occur when allowing 
good managers to differentiate themselves by short selling or use of leverage. 
However, if truth telling is to be insured in all states of nature, a regulator must 
be careful when restricting the size of short selling or leverage, since this will 
only influence the lower bound of the wage for the low type in the separation 
state and not the high bound for the high type. Moreover, we also demonstrate 
that bad managers can potentially play a role of financial advisors if they have 
additional information on distribution of managers. 
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Introduction 
Delegation of wealth management is an essential and an evolving feature of 
financial markets. History has been witness to the fact that the asset 
management industry has undergone major changes over the years. The period 
from 1990s to 2008 has contributed heavily towards changing the face of the 
industry. Technological change, deregulation and institutional changes 
(formation of hedge funds and private equity firms) paved the way for easy 
access to credit and ever increasing asset prices. As a result, the assets under 
management (AuM) escalated partially due to this rise in liquidity. It was not 
before 2008 that we saw a drastic decline in these figures. This happened around 
the time when credit crisis occurred and significantly affected the global financial 
industry. Many asset managers saw a 30-40% reduction in their AuM not only 
because of the crash in asset prices but also due to lack in confidence among 
investors who pulled their money out. Among other things, this brought into 
light the failures due to market liberalization and incentives that the industry 
gives to the managers to take more risks (Rajan 2005 and Michael Pinedo 2010).  
Following the credit crisis, the industry witnessed major structural changes and 
transformations. We see de-liberalization in many markets, investors setting new 
norms and standards for managers, more importance put on risk management 
and managers finding redemption in up-and-coming Middle east and Asian 
markets1.  
In 2010, the total assets under management (AuM) were estimated to be $121.1 
trillion globally. This was the highest ever annual increase in global wealth level.   
North America and Europe together held nearly 60% of the total wealth 
managed in world, with North America having the highest proportion ($38 
trillion). While rest of the world shared the rest, the Asia-pacific (ex Japan) region 
experienced the fastest growth in wealth amounting to 17.2%. Emerging 
countries together shared around $ 29.7 trillion in assets under management.2  
                                                          
1
 http://www.rolandberger.com/media/press/releases/512-
press_archive2012_sc_content/Asset_management_industry.html 
2
 Shaping a New Tomorrow: How to Capitalise on the Momentum of Change - BCG annual global 
wealth report 2011 
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Due to the size of the industry and increased centralization of money 
management, crisis such that we have recently witnessed can have large 
unpredictable effects on the economy. Hence, gaining deeper understanding of 
this industry is equally important for the academics and policy makers (Stracca 
2005). 
The asset management industry houses various types of funds (investment 
vehicles). Each fund has its own significance and fulfills needs of different 
investors that exist in the market. Moreover, they differ in their cost features, 
risk profiles and productivity characteristics.  The industry is broadly classified 
into two categories; institutional asset management and the retail market. 
Institutional asset management works directly with large institutions and high 
net-worth individuals. Hedge funds and private equity funds can be classified 
under this category. Retail includes all the mutual and some pension funds. It 
pools the investments made by smaller individual investors (Michael Pinedo 
2010) and is more regulated in contrast to its counterpart. Other funds not 
categorized above but are part of asset management industry are sovereign-
wealth funds (state-owned fund), insurance funds and exchange-traded funds 
(follows an index or a commodity, or a basket of assets like index funds but 
trades like a stock or an exchange - Investopedia).  
The focus of this paper is primary not to acquaint the reader with historic or 
prevalent industry structure, trends or figures. The discussion above is only to 
motivate systematic understanding of the industry. The main purpose of the 
thesis is to shed light on the problem on possible incentive problems in relation 
to delegation of investment management by investors to the asset managers and 
also formally model it. 
Asset management revolves around the idea that asset managers specialize in 
obtaining information from the market, obtaining certain skill which helps them 
generate returns on the wealth they manage or generate excess risk-adjusted 
returns resulting from the economies of scale. Since investors lack this 
specialization ability, they entrust that managers are better to manage their 
wealth than doing it themselves and manager is paid in return for his services. 
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This creates the classic case of information asymmetry where, when an agent is 
better informed than principal, it may result in an outcome characterized by 
dead weight loss.   
The problem that investor faces is two-fold; the first problem arises when agent 
indulges in perverse behavior such as shirking, taking too much risk, not making 
optimal portfolio choices, misreporting etc (moral hazard). The second problem 
arises when due to asymmetric information, investor struggles in choosing a 
good manager that maximizes the return on his wealth (adverse selection). Our 
paper studies the general theoretical work on these problems and their 
application to this and other industries. This preliminary work complements our 
original contribution towards modeling these problems in a principal agent 
model where an investor hires a manager to manage his money which helps us 
derive some meaningful conclusions and results at the end.  
The paper evolves as follows. Section 1 illustrates the prevalent compensation 
structures in the industry and how some of them contribute towards 
exacerbating the agency problem. Section 2 discusses the prevalent theoretical 
literature under moral hazard and adverse selection with many possible 
extensions that have been studied. We extend our discussion as we show the 
application of the standard theoretical frameworks to asset management 
industry and other sectors in section 3. The purpose of the section 2 and 3 is not 
only to discuss the agency problem, but also present relevant contributions that 
provide us with intuitive solutions and optimal contracts that mitigate the 
problem. Section 4 presents a principal agent model where we analyze the 
inefficiencies related to different situations of asymmetric information and 
characterize optimal contracts in presence of the moral hazard and adverse 
selection together and lastly section 5 concludes our main findings and proposes 
possible extensions. 
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1. Common Fee Structures in asset management industry 
The fee structures vary across the industry. Different investment vehicles 
available to the investors differ in their characteristics such as the regulatory 
environment, transparency and ability to generate returns. Therefore, the fee 
structures employed, usually depends on the type of investment vehicle the 
investor chooses to invest his money in.  
Conventionally, the industry has used the asset-based fees structure where 
remuneration is simply a fixed percentage proportional to the value of assets 
held by the investor. It is also known as management fee.  
Another class of compensation schemes often used is the performance-based fee 
structures, which have become an integral part of this industry. The supporters 
of these structures believe that performance-based remuneration is desirable, 
since they align the interests of the manager and the investor. But other people 
have criticized them to be biased in the favor of the manager and creating 
conflicts of interest. They claim that a performance fee, which originally provides 
the manager with the incentives to boost returns, also increases his risk appetite 
due to his limited liability3. When chips are low, this structure encourages 
manager to take more risk since the downside is very limited compared to 
potential upside. The performance-based fee structures came under scrutiny in 
the financial crisis of 2008, and following this the absolute fees levels for some 
investment vehicles were reduced. In the following part of this section, we will 
discuss the various performance fees structures prevalent in the industry and 
how they differ among investment vehicles 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of some of the most commonly found 
fee structures in the industry. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 http://www.statpro.com/blog/performance-fees-good-or-bad/ 
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Figure 1 - Fee structures prevalent in asset management industry 
 
There are essentially two types of performance fees structures: symmetric and 
asymmetric.  
In an asymmetric fee structure, fees are only paid over an increase in net asset 
value (NAV) of the management fund. In other words, when the fund is earning 
profits for its investors, the managers are entitled to the part of this increase in 
the value of the fund which is their performance fee. However, managers earn 
zero when investors are losing money.  
Different asymmetric fee structures are the following: 
 High-water mark (HWM) - Once performance fees are paid, the fund 
establishes a high-water mark with their highest periodical closing NAV. 
When the value of fund goes below HWM, no performance fee is earned 
until the NAV goes beyond the current HWM level. This structure ensures 
that manager receives performance fee only when he generates profits 
for the investors and not recovering losses. They are widely used in hedge 
funds. Black (2004) quotes a study by Van Hedge Fund Advisors that 
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states that 89 percent of hedge funds (at the end of the first quarter of 
2003) had fee structures that contain a HWM provision. 
 
 Per Share Performance Fee = Max (K* (End NAV - Beginning HWM  
 NAV), 0)  where K is the performance fee. 
 
 Hurdle Rate - Fees are only paid if fund performs over a certain 
benchmark eg. LIBOR. It is usually linear over this benchmark. It is also 
most commonly used in hedge funds. Black (2004) also found out that 
that only 18 percent of funds have a hurdle rate.  
 
 Fulcrum fees - Managers charge performance fee when they generate a 
return over a specified predetermined benchmark. However, if they are 
unable to do so their base (management) fee will be reduced. Also, only 
institutional or high end investors can be charged fulcrum fee. This 
performance fee structure is used in some mutual funds and is the only 
incentive system available in this particular industry, enforced by law 
(1970 amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940). However, it 
is not widely applied. In 1999 only 1.7% of the all the mutual funds in the 
market used fulcrum fee (Elton, Gruber and Blake 2002).  
 
Hedge funds usually employ a combination of a management fee and a 
performance fee. The ratio ranges from 1.5%/15% to 3%/30%. But majority of 
them use 2%/20%. The management fee in mutual funds ranges between 1%-
3%, and performance fees differs from fund to fund. The mutual funds that do 
employ incentive fees have a fixed and a variable component which should be 
symmetrical to the benchmark. 
 
Academics have questioned the common belief that an asymmetric fee 
structures necessarily induce managers to take more risk. Empirical and 
theoretical results show that individuals are risk averse when facing gains and 
risk seeking when faced with losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1992; Coval 
and Shumway 2005; Haigh and List 2005). In the given context, it means that 
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when over a benchmark, managers try to moderate the risk, hence securing 
themselves in a profitable position. However, when below the benchmark they 
will tend to increase the risk (Ross 2004; Coleman and Siegel 1999). In contrast, 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) find that risk seeking among loss-averse 
mangers increases with higher performance fee.      
                               
Moreover, in a symmetric fee structure, a manager typically receives an asset-
based fee and a bonus for outperformance while he has to pay a penalty if he 
underperforms. Hence, it relaxes the limited liability condition for a downside 
that is inherent in asymmetric fee structures. This very attribute has made it a 
quite popular research topic among academics. Theoretical results show that it 
dominates asymmetric fees in aligning the interests of managers and investors 
since it will encourage manager to take the risk desired by investor rather than 
motivating risky behavior, but it does not completely removes the agency 
problem (Stark 1987; Golec and Starks 2004).  However, it is a very rare 
possibility that one would see this fee structure often employed in reality. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Efficiency and private information 
In 1960 Ronald Coase presented his famous theorem stating that with clearly 
defined property rights, market participants would simply bargain and reach an 
efficient outcome. This proved to be a very important result because it did not 
rest on the perfect competition assumption of the first welfare theorem. 
According to Coase, no such assumption is needed, only the absence of 
transaction costs, designated property rights and voluntarily private bargaining.  
In later years, many researches have focused on the possible breakdown of this 
theorem due to asymmetric information of the market participants. Farrell 
(1987), models this by assuming asymmetrical information with respect to the 
preferences in the market. He shows that in the presence of private information, 
private contracting is only weakly efficient4. Moreover, Schmitz (2001) shows 
                                                          
4
 That is, it will depend on the parameters 
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that in the case with information asymmetry and where property rights may be 
limited5, efficiency can always be achieved. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss outcomes under different bargaining 
powers. Hence, we restrict ourselves to the case when there are only two parties 
bargaining, and one party has all the bargaining power. 
2.2 Contract theory and private information 
In economics we are often concerned with how information asymmetries will 
affect the outcome of some fiduciary relationship between two or more parties. 
If the objects of all parties were the same, there would be no inefficiencies and 
no formalization of the agreement will be needed. However, this is often not the 
case. A worker will have objectives that do not correspond to the objectives of 
the company, a manager of a mutual fund will want to maximize his own 
payment or an insured agent may take action he would not otherwise take if not 
protected. It is not difficult to see that examples like this could be found in all 
aspects of the economy. If the objectives between the players differ, the 
principal could propose a contract which would protect his interest such that the 
agent is given the incentives to take actions the principal would have done in the 
absence of the relationship (Laffont and Martimort 2001). Contract theory is a 
field of economics which is concerned with the design of such incentive 
compatible contract under various information structures (Bolton and 
Dewatripont 2005). A contract is an agreement between parties (individuals, 
businesses, organizations or government agencies) which may or may not be 
legally binding6 and involves a promise to do something in return for a valuable 
benefit (exchange of promises). The legal nature of the ‘Contract’ (‘Contract law’) 
is derived from the principle expressed in the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda, 
which literally means "pacts must be kept". Moreover, a contract specifies the 
terms and conditions under each parties commitment.  
In contract theory two important cases of information asymmetry are described. 
The first case is referred as ‘Adverse Selection’, where because some parties 
                                                          
5
 He model this by assuming if no property rights exist, the decision variable will be stochastically 
determined.  
6
 Reflecting the power of enforcement 
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have more information than others regarding the state of the world, results in 
market inefficiency and possibly a full market breakdown. In an influential paper 
by Akerlof (1970), he shows that, using the market for used cars as an example, 
car owners with good quality cars will never put their car up for sale since the 
buyers are only willing to pay an amount equal to an estimate based on the 
distribution of quality (private value). Thus reducing the amount the buyers are 
willing to pay for a car given that they only know the distribution. The idea is that 
this looped mechanism may then, in the worst case, lead to a market 
breakdown, or possibly, “a market for lemons”. This will be covered in more 
detail, as well as possible solutions to the adverse selection problem under 
section 4. 
The second case is known as ‘Moral Hazard’ which occurs when one party has 
private information and the actions taken would influence the fiduciary 
relationship. Examples of this may be a worker, which is costly to monitor for the 
employer, could work hard or shirk, or a manager of mutual fund could do 
thorough analytical work prior to his investments or he could more or less 
arbitrarily pick a portfolio matching his own risk profile.  These cases are often 
explained and analyzed in the literature using a Principal-Agent model, in which a 
principal that hires an agent to pursue his interests’ faces difficulties arising from 
asymmetric information and this problem is called ‘agency problem’ or ‘principal 
agent problem’. There exists a large literature that discusses analytical properties 
of principal agent framework and provides us with an enlightening 
understanding of how optimal contracts are designed when faced with agency 
problem.  
2.2.1 Adverse Selection 
In his famous article “market for lemons”, George A. Akerlof introduced the idea 
that information asymmetry regarding the quality of a good could lead to a 
complete market breakdown. Akerlof showed, under the assumption of linear 
utility functions and uniformly distributed quality, there will not be any trade at 
the market clearing price, even if there exist sellers and buyers willing to trade. 
The main intuition is that only the average quality of goods matter to the 
uninformed buyer. Hence, the informed seller will not put up goods whose 
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quality exceeds the reservation price of the buyer (Akerlof assumes this to be 
equal to the quality) and the distribution gets augmented until the point where 
the price is equal to 0 and no trade is possible. This is a direct consequence of the 
continuous quality distribution.  
Similarly, if quality is defined discrete, Akerlof showed the important result that 
the bad cars drive the good out of the market. The reason for this is that, due to 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, buyers can only infer the 
true quality of the good based on the distribution. This implies that all cars will 
sell for the same price. Thus, any seller knowing his car is of high quality would 
never trade since he would be implicitly subsidizing the sales of lower quality 
cars. This, in turn, reduces the average quality of cars in the market and lowers 
the price even further. 
Akerlof uses these adverse selection problems to explain a variety of economic 
observations. In addition to his well-known example of the used cars market, he 
applies the theory to insurance markets, discrimination in the labor market and 
credit market in underdeveloped countries. We will discuss some of these and 
other important applications in section 3.2.  
Much focus has been put on possible solutions to the adverse selection problem. 
Akerlof himself suggests brand names as a way to indicate quality and to give the 
buyer leverage when the quality is below expectations, thus guaranties to ensure 
the consumer some minimum expected quality and licensing to counteract 
uncertainty. 
Laffont and Martimort (2001) point out that in the case of adverse selection 
where an agent may get access to information which is not available to the 
principal when a task is delegated, in order to achieve efficiency, an incentive 
compatible contract must be prepared such that it entices the agent to share the 
private information. In the literature, this is referred as the “revelation 
principle”. The term first appeared in Baron and Myerson (1982), where the 
authors considered the problem of regulating a monopolist with cost unknown 
to the regulator. In their proposition they define the revelation principle as: 
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Without any loss of generality, the regulator may be restricted to regulatory 
policies which require the firm to report its cost parameter θ and which give the 
firm no incentive to lie. 
However, the most common way of modeling solutions to the problem is 
signaling (Spence 1973) and screening (Rotchield and Stiglitz 1976). The next sub-
sections will briefly go through the theoretical background for these ideas. 
Signaling 
The main idea in this approach is that the informed party can take actions prior 
to signing the contract which signals their ability. In Spence’s model, workers 
with privately known productivity select an education level that maximizes 
expected wage minus cost of education given their productivity. Moreover, the 
labor market is perfectly competitive and firms are risk neutral. This implies that 
all workers are paid their expected productivity. Thus, by observing a specific 
education level, firms will offer contracts contingent on this specific level. This in 
turn leads to two special cases. 
If, all types selects the same education (e.g. no education at all), we have what’s 
called a pooling equilibrium. In this case, all workers are hired and offered a 
wage equal to the expected productivity. It follows from this that there are an 
infinite pooling equlibria, but only one is socially optimal, and that’s when no 
agent get educated. This is because, in contrast to human capital theory, in these 
models education has no effect on the productivity of the workers. 
Another possible equilibrium is a separating one. In this case all types choose a 
different education level. Consequently, each are paid their true productivity 
(and not just the expected productivity of a randomly selected worker), and firms 
are able to perfectly verify the type of the agent based on their education 
decision. Moreover, as long as productivity of the high types is larger than the 
low types, and cost of education is decreasing in type, there will always be a 
possible separating equilibrium.  
A key property in separating the workers is the so called Spence-Mirrlees or 
single crossing property (Spence 1973 and Mirrlees 1971). This condition means 
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benefit from deviating from the equilibrium path and this deviation is unique for 
this type, the firm should be able to infer the type deviating. Bank and Sobell 
(1987) puts even more restrictions on stabile equilibrium’s. Their divinity 
equilibrium condition states that in addition to the intuitive criteria, if there is a 
profitable deviation by one type which is also profitable by another type then no 
weight should be put on that type.   
Screening 
Conversely to the case with signaling, screening models assume the uninformed 
part moves first. The idea, first proposed by Rotchield and Stiglitz (1976) was that 
the uninformed party could offer a menu of contracts inducing the informed 
party to self-select and reveal their type.  
An important result which has huge impact on the solution to screening models 
is the so called revelation principle (Myerson 1981). With respect to mechanism 
design, it means the uninformed party can restrict himself to self to direct 
revelation mechanisms and he can never do better than this. This result is quite 
intuitive. Consider an indirect mechanism with some Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
strategies for the principal and agents. According to the revelation principle, this 
can be replaced with a direct revelation mechanism. If this was not true then, an 
agent of type    would report some other type  ́ and receive strictly larger 
expected utility. But this contradicts the original equilibrium condition, hence in 
equilibrium the agents must report truthfully. Since this can be thought of as 
reporting to a neutral third party who then implements the optimal strategy 
based on the reported information, the revelation principle implies that 
centralization dominates decentralization (Flrckinger 2010).  
Another principle, related to the revelation principle is the so called taxation 
principle Guesnerie (1981, 1995) and Rochet(1986). This means that any 
equilibrium price schedule can be written as a nonlinear pricing scheme. 
Moreover, the principal can focus on more realistic compensation structures 
when designing the contract (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000). 
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2.2.2 Moral hazard 
Pauly (1968) was the first to introduce the idea of moral hazard in an economic 
context. He considered the problem in the medical insurance industry and 
defined moral hazard as intangible loss-producing propensities of the individual 
assured. Moreover, he showed that individuals opting for more medical care 
with insurance than in its absence is due to rational economic behavior and has 
little to do with morality. Arrow (1970) broadened the implications of the 
intuition made by Pauly. He said that optimality of complete insurance is no 
longer valid when method of insurance influences the demand for the services 
provided by the insurance policy. They both agreed that if the agent is risk averse, 
it is not socially optimal to provide him with full insurance. Hence, due to moral 
hazard, the market allocations will always be constrained Pareto optimal7.  But 
neither of them showed how to formally model this aspect. It was in the paper 
by Zeckhauser (1970) that moral hazard was formally modeled for the first time. 
In the same institutional setting as Pauly, he presented the optimization problem 
of the individual. The results were determined using first order conditions. 
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Mirrlees (1972) later applied these principal-
agent problems in a general setting of expected utility subject to deliberately 
chosen contingent contracts. 
The first order approach was applied to other particular applications such as 
share cropping (Stiglitz 1974), capital markets, and incentive and pay structures 
(Stiglitz 1975, Haris and Raviv 1979, Mirrlees 1976). But, Mirrlees (1975, 1999) in 
a critical paper pointed out the common problem of assuming that the first order 
approach is valid even when certain assumptions established in the model does 
not hold. He shows that this technique will be invalid unless at the optimum, the 
outcome to the agent’s problem is unique. If there is no uniqueness, the first 
order conditions are not even necessary conditions for optimality. In other 
words, the procedure ignores that the solution of the problem should be a global 
maximum not a local maxima. Mirrlees claimed that in a situation where, the 
density of output is conditioned on the action of the agent, it needs to fulfill two 
conditions; monotone likelihood function (MLR) which implies that that payment 
                                                          
7
 We extend the Pauly’s and Arrow’s discussion later in section 3.2.2 
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schedule of an agent needs to be increasing in output and an agent’s action be 
convex at each level of output (CDF). He showed that inclusion of these two 
conditions makes the first order approach valid. Rogerson (1985) concurred with 
Mirrlees and proved the conditions above to be true using a simpler proof. 
Grossman and Hart (1983) demostrated the same, but were criticized for its 
applicability when principal is risk averse (Rogerson 1985). 
Holmström (1979) found the first order approach to be valid for the case where 
the distribution function of outcomes is a combination of two convex fixed 
distributions and the agent’s action evaluates the weights of this combination. 
Jewitt (1988) criticized Mirrless-Rogerson approach of first order condition 
validation and prophesized that it lacks applicability in situations where the CDF 
property does not hold. He presented a procedure for validity; the first step is to 
ensure that the multiplier on the incentive constraint is positive. Secondly, 
ensure that the utility of the agent falls within a known class, and finally, make 
sure that the utility function of the agent is concave. 
Hart and Holmström (1987) discuss two widely used methodologies in moral 
hazard problems. First is known as a state-space formulation introduced by 
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973). Here the verifiable outcome is 
determined together by the set of actions the agent chooses and possible the 
state of nature. The payoff function which also depends on the actions and 
outcomes is controlled by the principal. The principal’s problem is to construct an 
incentive structure that maps the outcomes into the payments of the agent. It is 
assumed in the model that exerting effort is costly to the agent. The agent’s 
utility function is separable. That is his utility function consists of a function of 
the payment he receives minus a cost function of effort. The principal’s utility 
function is the profit earned minus the transfers given to the agent. The 
distribution of the state of nature, the outcome function, and cost and utility 
functions are agreed upon together by principal and agent.  
An alternative and rather economically insightful formulation of the problem was 
initiated by Mirrlees (1974, 1976) and later explored by Holmström (1979). In 
this formulation, the agent’s choice of action ‘a’ determines the distribution over 
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output ‘x’ and profit   ’, which is derived from the distribution of state of nature. 
As Hart and Holmström explain, they suppose that the derived distribution takes 
a form of  (     ) with a density function  (     ). The principal chooses the 
least cost reward scheme based on the action he wants agent to take. Moreover, 
the principal knows the preferences of the agent and thus he is able to infer the 
action the agent will take despite of the fact that he cannot directly observe it. 
Participation is ensured by promising the agent some minimum expected utility 
and that incentive scheme provided to him is homogenous to the set of actions 
he will choose. This approach is called parameterized distribution formulation. 
Hart and Holmström (1987) discuss the formulations above in a basic model, 
where the actions can take on two values H (Work hard) or L (being lazy) and in a 
general setting where actions are defined continuously. They infer that the 
optimal incentive scheme is characteristically similar in both cases. But an 
important distinction is that in a two-action model one has to compare the 
results of being hard working with being lazy, meaning that since there is no 
continuous trade-off, it is hard to conclude anything about the choice of action. 
In contrast, given that first order approach8 is valid, the continuous effort case 
implies that it can be proved that effort satisfies first order stochastic 
dominance. Furthermore, they criticize solutions obtained in the static moral 
hazard problems by being highly sensitive to the information technology, 
meaning that by manipulating the structure one can formulate any reward 
system. They explain that incentive schemes prevalent in reality are far simpler 
than what is used theoretically and fail to be consistent across wide range of 
circumstances. 9 
In the literature, the moral hazard problem can be extended to a case where a 
potential risk neutral agent has limited liability (LL). This case was first formally 
modeled by David Sappington (1983) in an adverse selection model10, which 
discussed that the principal in some cases has to satisfy some LL constraints in 
                                                          
8
 Incentive constraint is relaxed in case with continuous effort. This very phenomenon is referred 
as first order approach.  
9
 Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives justifies the optimality of 
using linear scheme in  principal agent contracts 
10
 Please refer to the section 2.2.1  
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addition to the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. The paper 
discussed two situations; first referred as LL resulting from limited wealth/no 
wealth and second referred as LL on utility associated to a minimum level of 
utility. In this paper, he concludes that when solving the adverse selection 
problem in light of these two LL constraints separately it results in a similar 
optimal contract. But Lawarrée and Audenrode (1999) successfully demonstrated 
that the same result would not hold in a moral hazard model. They show that 
constraints on transfers Pareto dominate the constraints on utility in a moral 
hazard setting. They argue that the difference in the results is due to adverse 
selection models have a one to one relationship between the choice variable of 
agent (For ex- effort) and output. But in the moral hazard models the output’s 
value is uncertain when agent chooses the effort level.   
Prior to Lawarrée and Audenrode (1999), Innes (1990) introduced limited 
liability, where a risk neutral entrepreneur makes an unobservable ex-ante effort 
choice while employing the investment funds of a risk-neutral investor. He 
imposes LL constraints on the transfers, which require transfers to be above a 
minimum level.  Laffont and Martimort (2002) showed the same. They explained 
the limited liability case where the optimal contract is deduced to the point that 
the delegation will no longer be costless (which is actually the case in first best11) 
to the principal, because the agent is now only liable to some extent and has to 
be given transfers greater than some exogenous level. If this exogenous given 
level is smaller than the optimal transfers subject to some realization of nature, 
the agent must be provided with positive limited liability rent. This means that 
cost of requesting effort is second best cost to the principal (higher than first 
best cost).  They generalize the same result to the case when the agent is risk 
averse. Here, due to the agent’s risk preferences, the optimal transfers would 
entail that the agent has to be paid a risk premium to induce participation.  
Therefore the delegation would again be costlier than first best cost, which will 
increase with the degree of risk aversion. 
                                                          
11
 Laffont and Martimort (2002) refer to this as the case when the effort is observable and both 
agent and principal as risk neutral. Here principal is able to extract all the rent from the agent 
since he only has to pay him transfers that equal his reservation utility. 
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Another important extension to the moral hazard case is when the principal hires 
many agents together to do a task. The common problem discussed in the 
literature is an issue of cooperation. Itoh (1991) compares the optimal contracts 
in a situation when the principal who can’t observe the action choices made by 
the agents, can either design a task structure which makes the agent only 
specialize on their own task and does not require helping others in the team or 
designing a non-specialized task structure which encourages agents to help 
others.  He finds that teamwork will be an optimal choice if each agent is able to 
increase his own actions in response to rise in help from other agents in the 
team. It is also demonstrated that when doing a task and the agents receive 
marginal disutility, if free riding occurs, teamwork would still be optimal since it 
would cause the agent to cut down his (her) cost that he had to induce on the 
task. Mookherjee (1984) discusses that when working in teams, if agents are able 
to learn about each other’s’ actions, it motivates collusive behavior. Therefore 
agents can together choose an outcome which is Pareto inferior and likely to be 
different than the Nash equilibrium outcome that principal prefers. Ma (1988) 
showed an approach to deal with this problem. He suggested that, by providing 
agents with an extensive set of strategies such that the principal can employ 
second best Bayes-Nash equilibrium as a unique outcome to the problem. 
Non-cooperative behavior in the team will make efficiency unsustainable if joint 
output is the only informative signal of the collective effort exerted. Each agent 
has to induce full cost of effort while only sharing part of outcome. Hence, it 
leads to a potential free riding problem. The solution suggested involves 
providing group incentives such that agents are punished for resulting output 
level below optimal level and given bonuses when it is above. This would induce 
agents to take productive actions together and hence imply efficiency. However, 
a third party (principal)12 is needed not only to monitor but also to impose the 
punishments or to endorse the bonuses. He (she) will not contribute towards 
output, but will have a share in it (Holmström 1982). In the similar setting, Ma 
(1988) shows that when actions of the agents are observable to each other, it 
induces perfect information and thereby removing the agency cost involved.  
                                                          
12
 Principal cannot be a team member to make this incentive scheme credible. 
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Lazear and Rosen (1981) analyze the linear compensation schemes relative to 
the payment based on ranking in multi-agent organizations. They show that 
when agents are risk neutral, both schemes result in same efficient allocation of 
resources, but the same does not hold when agents are risk-averse. In this case, 
the payment based on ranking is preferred by the agents since it provides them 
with insurance against uncertain events.  
In another setting Holmström and Milgrom (1991) extended the single task 
models and investigated moral hazard in a multi-tasks principal agent model. 
They allow the principal to either choose to have various tasks for the agent or 
allot a task that has many different dimensions to work on. The problem 
highlighted in this setting is to design an incentive scheme that will not only fulfill 
its fundamental job of making agents work hard or to distribute risk, but also 
serve the purpose of getting agents to focus their time and attention to various 
tasks or dimensions. They emphasize that task(s) design is an essential tool for an 
optimal incentive scheme. In addition to this, one can use variety of other 
instruments to control the agent’s actions such as combining similar tasks into 
one, manipulate the bounds on incentives that one receives on task completion, 
and alter the restrictions on different approaches the agents take to do a job. All 
these suggestions are minutely explored, but under a set of very strong 
assumptions which made this analysis simpler and opened up avenues for 
research in multi-task setting.  
An interesting development was later made by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 
(1999 II) where they studied incentives of government officials in a multi-task 
career concern model. Their paper aimed to support the sociological findings in a 
survey on US government agencies13. The technology is adopted from the 
influential paper of Holmström (1982) where output is a function of the agent’s 
talent (static), continuous effort, and a stochastic noise term. Unlike 
Holmström14, they investigate the impact of effort over different tasks, such that 
the different talents suggest strengths in different tasks. The basic premise of 
career concern models is that in absence of explicit incentives, the agents exert 
                                                          
13
 James Q. Wilson survey of US governmental agencies 1989 
14
 Single-task two period model with static talent variable.  
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effort in order to make the market realize their true potential, something that is 
subject to uncertainty. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole paper is able to 
successfully extend implications of this basic premise when the moral hazard 
problem is modeled dynamically over tasks than time. They show that 
uncertainty in the market about the agent true type is positively correlated with 
the agent’s effort. In other words, with higher uncertainty, the agent exerts more 
effort to let the market know about his (her) true type. Therefore it pays off for 
the organization to specialize their agents in certain tasks. However, this may 
weaken the overall performance of the organization since some value driving 
tasks may be neglected. This result confirms one of the findings in the US survey, 
as they conclude the result above as an essential tradeoff in government 
agencies something which is found to be reverse in explicit incentive private 
firms. Furthermore, this demonstrates the idea that when modeling moral 
hazard problems dynamically, implicit incentives play a significant role to deter 
agent to involve in perverse behavior.  
Prior to work from Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999 I &II) and Holmström 
(1982), introductory work in dynamic moral hazard models came into picture 
when economists pointed out the importance of the potential dynamic nature of 
principal agent relationship in removing the agency problem. First to do so, was 
Radner (1981) who found that in a principal agent setting over a repeated game, 
a contractual setting can sustain since the principal will generally find a way to 
prevent an agent to indulge in undesirable behavior. He finds that in a finite 
repeated game this leads to the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium (almost Nash 
equilibrium). Rubinstein (1977) finds the same to be close to Pareto optimal in 
presence of a Nash equilibria using law of iterated logarithm.  
Later Fama (1980) concluded that since reputation of the manager plays a 
significant role as a career aspect, the market will alone eliminate the agency 
problem. This would imply that implicit incentives will be sufficient to relax the 
incentive problems, and one would not need formal contacts. Holmström (1982) 
found that this efficiency can only be reached under some restrictive 
assumptions. If the agent is risk averse and positively discounts future profits, 
efficiency will not be met since implicit incentives alone will not compensate him 
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for the risk. In addition he points out that empirical evidence has shown the 
importance of implicit and explicit incentives in reality.  
In the literature of moral hazard, one significant contribution comes from 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). They relax the assumption of commitment and 
assume effort exerted by the agent today has long term effect over the periods 
that follow. Therefore, present effort level influences the probability 
distributions of outcomes for all subsequent periods. The principal will 
throughout the renegotiating stages not have any private information on the 
probability distributions of the outcomes in the future. Thus, a contract can be 
renegotiated after the agent has chosen his (her) action and before the 
realization of outcome. The game progresses as follows; after the agent has 
exerted effort, the contract can be renegotiated and principal can offer a set of 
contracts for the each level of effort the agent may have taken before the 
renegotiation stage. Basically, the problem transforms into an adverse selection 
problem with equilibrium being a set of mixed strategies and different effort 
levels correspond to the agents’ type. If payment is independent of outcomes, an 
agent can choose the lowest possible effort. So in equilibrium it requires that the 
principal induces agent to choose higher effort by promising higher transfers for 
good outcome, but also make him (her) choose lower effort levels with 
sufficiently high probability that contract would not by renegotiated.  
Another set of models developed under dynamic moral hazard comes from the 
recent work of Biasis (2009a) and Laffont and Martimort (2001). They present a 
similar, discrete time, two-period models. In these models, incentive 
compatibility implies an increase in expected utility of the agent after success 
and decrease after failure. Here the principal can take advantage of the dynamic 
nature of the relationship in order to relax the incentive constraints. For instance 
- the transfer promised at the second period after two successes can be used to 
entice effort at both first and second period. Moreover, Biasis allows for scaling 
of the project between the periods, and finds that closing the firm at the second 
period if production is low in the first period can help avoiding a full market 
breakdown. The intuition is that the agent rationally expect the project to be 
liquidated (or the investor exercising his walkaway option in the case of money 
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management) when the project performs poorly. While such liquidation is good 
to provide the agent with incentives, it hurts efficiency. Therefore, by introducing 
this extension to the model it still reflects the rent/efficiency tradeoff. Moreover, 
if the manager can be replaced, Biasis postulates that the principal needs to 
weigh this alternative in relation to their current state and cost of finding a new 
manager.  
Under the discrete infinite time horizon case, the continuation utility of the 
agent and the value function of the principal are evaluated given the information 
available at the beginning of period n. All the other assumptions are same as in 
one and two period case. Here, the continuation utility of the agent evolves as a 
function of the cash flow realizations. The idea is that following a negative 
(positive) realization of output, the continuation utility of the agent must be 
reduced (increased), such that the incentive compatibility holds.  Moreover, Biais 
(2009b) discusses that due to the sensitive nature of the continuation utility to 
performance of the firm, incentive compatibility requires that this sensitivity be 
equal to the magnitude of the moral hazard problem (reflected by the agents 
outside option and his cost of effort). 
The last dimension that we will discuss under the theoretical literature related to 
moral hazard is when output is unobservable to the principal. This topic is quite 
important part for our paper since we adopt it in section 4. The basic idea is that 
in some cases principal cannot observe and verify the output generated by the 
agent and must therefore rely on him (her) to report it truthfully. Due to the 
unobservability of cash flows (or any other measure of success) the agent can 
divert it to his advantage and can report lower profits. This feature was first 
initiated in economic models by Bolton and Sharfstein (1990). In their one-period 
model, they study the situation in a debt contract where agents can divert the 
funds. In the event when he defaults on his debt, he is then faced with a threat 
of losing his collateral or not getting financing in the future. De Marzo and 
Fishman (2007) employ similar assumptions to a long term financial contracting 
problem where agents use debt and equity as optimal tools to structure the 
capital. Due to the dynamic nature of the contract, the threat of termination at 
any time by the principal (investor) makes the agent truthfully share the cash 
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flow than divert it. In their model they define the benefit from diverting funds 
equal to λ which varies between 0 and 1. They suggest that an optimal contract 
entails that in order to induce agent to report truthfully he must be paid in terms 
of λ per dollar of reported cash flow. However when the agent decides to steal 
the cash (1- λ) is lost by the agent, which is regarded as the cost of diversion. This 
is so because the stealing is considered as an inefficient activity. Finally, in case λ 
= 0 there is no moral hazard problem.  
In contrast to the discrete-time study in this paper, DeMarzo and Sannikov 
(2006) conducted a similar analysis in a continuous-time infinite horizon. Our 
model in section 4 also illustrates the possibility of cash diversion by an agent 
which is unobservable to the principal in one-period adverse selection and moral 
hazard problem.  
3. Theoretical perspective: Asset management industry 
and other institutional settings  
3.1 Asset management industry, stylized facts and theoretical relevance 
3.1.1 Stylized facts about active management 
As institutional savings drastically increase both absolute and relative to the 
retail market, in a market characterized by fierce competition and huge 
economies of scale, different asset managers battle for the right to manage, and 
potentially collect large fees on these investments. Nevertheless, active managed 
funds generally perform poorly relative to their passive counterparts (Malkiel, 
1995; Gruber, 1996; Fernandes et al 2009). But Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 
interprets this as the investors, having inferior knowledge, evaluates the 
manager on wrong (or potentially misleading) criteria, leading to a mispricing in 
the market Fernandes et al 2009. 
Furthermore, there exists little evidence of persistence in returns (Berk and 
Green, 2004). Berk and Green argue that this is because investors evaluate 
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managers based on their historical performance and will continue to pool funds 
into managers until the expected return reaches the competitive level15.  
3.1.2 Incentive theory and delegates portfolio management 
Information asymmetry is prominent in the asset management industry. An 
investor will not have complete information with respect to the true skill of the 
managers in the market. Neither will he be able to observe the effort put into ex-
ante analyses; and in some cases the portfolio selection and risk profile. 
Naturally, delegated portfolio management has seen much research into these 
topics and we now attempt to give a brief review on the rich literature that exists 
on these areas. 
In general, investors delegating the management of their assets to an agent 
cause frictions due to the different object functions of the investor and the 
manager. The manager, will privately make decisions which may not be in the 
best interest of the investor. There are several factors which may help mitigate 
these frictions and (Ackermann, Mcenally, and Ravenscraft 1999) identify four 
such factors in the investor manager relationship.  
 
i. The first factor is the contract. That is, the contract can be designed such 
that the manager is given the incentives to make effort and risk decisions 
that are optimal for the investor. The problem for the investor is that if he 
cannot observe the effort or risk choices of the manager and the agent is 
risk averse or protected by limited liability, he cannot directly dictate the 
effort or risk level in the contract. Thus, the first best cannot be reached. 
The investor will instead have to settle for the second best, implying a 
positive expected rent to the manager16. If there is adverse selection, the 
contract can also be used to screen the managers17. 
 
ii. Ownership structure may also help mitigate the problem of moral 
hazard. Often, especially in hedge funds, managers have substantial 
                                                          
15
 Implicitly assuming decreasing returns to scale 
16 If the manager could make effort and risk part of the contract he could extract all rent from 
the agent. 
17
 See section 4 
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investments in their own fund. This joint ownership structure exposes the 
manager to the same risks as the investors and thus helps align the 
objectives of the investors and managers. However, as pointed out by 
Ackermann, Mcenally, and Ravenscraft (1999), given a risk averse 
manager, he may end up choosing a risk level below that is preferred by 
the investors. Moreover, Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) show that risk 
taking by the manager is greatly reduced if the manager has a substantial 
investment of his own wealth into his own fund (at least 30%). When 
managers differ in their ability to generate excess return above the risk 
free rate, ownership structure could also potentially be used as a 
signaling device (we will discuss this part in more detail in section 4.5.4) 
 
iii. Thirdly, government regulation may put restrictions on the extent at 
which the managers may adopt certain risky strategies, lockup periods 
and investments criteria (such as allowing for smaller minimum 
investment). This is less relevant for the hedge funds than the more 
regulated mutual funds industry. One argument often used to rationalize 
the minimal regulation facing hedge funds, is that investors of such 
investment vehicles are assumed to be more rational and informed than 
the average investor (considering the high minimum investment and the 
large degree of institutional clients), and thus does not need the same 
protection as for instance investors in mutual funds. Nevertheless, there 
has been increasing concern regarding the level of regulation in the 
industry, magnified by the financial crisis, where short selling in many 
financial institutions was temporarily banned in order to reduce the 
negative impact short selling can have in an already vulnerable sector.  
 
iv. Finally, market forces may also help reduce the principal agent problem. 
The idea is that well informed, rational investors, will exit funds where 
effort or risk does not match their optimal preferences and invest in 
higher performing funds with better matching risk profiles. Obviously, 
these selection mechanisms scale with the degree of fund transparency. 
Thus, for hedge funds, especially with a joint ownership where replacing 
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the manager may prove difficult, this effect is limited (Ackermann, 
Mcenally, and Ravenscraft 1999). 
 
In his influential paper, Stoughton (1993) introduced an alternative formulation 
of the principal agent problem for delegated portfolio management. He assumed 
the existence of two assets in the market, one risk free and one risky. The risky 
asset is assumed to be normally distributed. Managers can, in light of their 
expertise observe a signal in the market that is correlated with the true value of 
the risky asset before selecting the portfolio. By exerting costly and unobservable 
(to the investor) effort, the manager can potentially increase the precision of this 
signal. Hence, the investor must consider two dimensions of the moral hazard 
problem. First, the unobservable level of effort and then the portfolio choice will 
affect the risk and return of the gross portfolio. With these conditions, Stoughton 
finds that a linear sharing rule leads to significant underinvestment, but by 
introducing a quadratic compensation structure this underinvestment becomes 
mitigated. An important consequence of this has been termed the irrelevance 
result (Admati and Pfleiderer 1997). Admati and Pfleiderer finds that the 
inefficient low investment caused by a linear compensation structure is due to 
the manager have the possibility to scale his response to the signal and undo the 
incentive part of the contract. But Gomez and Sharma (2003) finds that this is 
only true if there are no restrictions on the amount the manager can short-sell. 
Conversely, linear sharing rules can be optimal and Ozerturk (2004) finds that if 
the manager can affect the price of the risky asset by trading, these contracts do 
give the manager the incentives to gather information. Moreover, if the investor 
is sufficiently large, Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1984) show that a quadratic 
contract dominates linear sharing rules. 
 
Palomino and Prat (2002) show that when the agent controls effort and risk, and 
has limited liability, the optimal contract can be characterized by a simple bonus 
scheme where he is paid a fixed fee above some benchmark18. Livdan and 
Tchistyiy (2010) also considers a two-dimensional dynamic problem with hidden 
                                                          
18
 However, this is a construct of the binominal effort technology 
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cash flow and risk choice and demonstrate that if the state of nature is non-
verifiable, it may be optimal for the investor to gradually increase investment.  
 
In the literature, many researchers have focused on one specific compensation 
structure commonly observed in the hedge-fund industry, i.e. a high-watermark 
loss recovery system. Ray and Chakraborty (2008) employ a two-period principal 
agent model where the agent is compensated by such a rule. They find that 
walkaway by the investor is more likely when the fund moves away from the 
watermark. Moreover, when the fund is below the watermark, the manager 
reduces effort and increases risk. They find this to be partially consistent with 
empirical observations. A fund below the watermark will generally increase 
variance in return, but following a one-period bad performance, managers will 
actually reduce risk in order to maintain the continuation value of the contract. 
Zhan (2010) finds similar results in a multi-period simulated model. Furthermore, 
he shows that if the fund is only a little under the watermark, the manager may 
actually increase his effort level, but once the cost to reach the watermark 
becomes sufficiently large, he reduces costly effort and the fund drops even 
further below the required value. In this case, Zhan proposes that it may be 
optimal for both the investor and the manager to reset the watermark for 
incentive purposes. Ray (2011) focuses on the downside of high-watermark 
contracts and he points out that funds below the watermark increases 
subsequent risk and have lower sharpe ratios. 
 
In a model with adverse selection, Aragon and Qian (2006) analyses the use of 
high-watermarks in the compensation structure as a signaling device and 
demonstrate that information asymmetry is a requirement for justification of the 
mechanism. Moreover, they also find empirical support for their predications as 
high-watermarks are more common in funds with shorter track records or long 
lock-out periods. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) focus on the prominent use 
of high-watermark contracts in the hedge fund industry relative to the mutual 
fund industry. They claim that high-watermarks can be used as a credible signal 
of diminishing returns in the industry (mutual fund managers rely more on 
accumulation of assets under management to increase compensation). In an 
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empirical paper Deuskar et al (2011) studies the change in fee structures and 
demonstrate that less established funds change their fee structure more 
frequently. They also find support that high skilled managers with short track 
record reduce the fixed proportion of the compensation and increase the 
incentive part to signal ability. 
 
Using the formulation of Stoughton (1993), Stremme (2001) considers an 
adverse selection problem where one type of manager has superior market 
information. He finds that in a dynamic environment with learning, bonus 
contracts are optimal. Stoughton and Heinkel (1994) show, using a model with 
adverse selection and two periods, that an optimal pooling contract requires 
lower incentives than what is the case for a single period. Interestingly, they also 
find that if the fund outperforms a benchmark with sufficient amount, this 
indicates that the performance is not due to the deep skill parameter but rather 
pure luck. Das and Sundaram (1999) use a slightly more complex technology with 
two assets where the informed manager knows the true combined distribution. 
With a special focus on fulcrum fees (see section 1) and letting the manager 
propose the fee structure (have all the bargaining power) they find that investors 
can be made strictly better off by prohibiting fulcrum fees19.  
 
In a principal agent model with moral hazard similar to the carrier concerns 
model of Holmström (1982), Farnsworth (2003) uses a dynamic model to analyze 
the gains from learning, but unlike Holmström the managers are assumed to 
have an informational advantage over the principal. He demonstrates that when 
beliefs are non-homogenous, the optimal contract constitutes a fixed proportion 
of the assets under management and an increased probability of receiving a 
bonus based on performance as the reputation of the manager increases. 
Focusing more on the effects of career concerns in a model with high-watermark 
provision, Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) find in their empirical study that 
high-watermarks have little effect on the risk profile of the manager. They 
interpret this as an indication that hedge fund managers put much weight on 
their reputation in the industry. 
                                                          
19
 Arguably, they only compare fulcrum fees to an asymmetric fee structure 
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3.2 Theoretical work in other institutional settings 
3.2.1 Credit rationing 
This phenomenon refers to a situation where lenders limit the supply of 
additional credit to borrowers, even if the borrowers are willing to pay higher 
interest rates. Banks usually in reality are able to distinguish between borrowers 
(bank statements/wealth is an essential tool) to a certain extent. They charge 
higher interest to the high-risk borrowers or ask for more collateral requirements 
and thus credit rationing becomes less likely. But in spite of this, it is impossible 
to identify the types perfectly, so credit rationing occurs (Paschke notes)20 
Moral hazard 
Tirole (2006) uses a principal agent model to explain credit rationing, with a 
focus on moral hazard. A common idea is that an increase in the interest rate has 
no effect on the borrower in the event of bankruptcy since he is protected by 
limited liability. A higher interest rate would imply a lower stake for the 
borrower, since he now has to pay more than the normal rate to get access to 
certain amount of money. This reduced stake motivates him to pursue projects 
with high private benefits, which in turn may reduce the probability of 
reimbursement.  
Tirole studies the phenomena in a simple agency model and uses it to illustrate 
the role of net worth. In this model, an “entrepreneur”(borrower) does not have 
enough money to finance a fixed-size project and must therefore resort to 
outside funding (common lenders such as bank). The entrepreneur controls his 
effort level and may also chose between projects with different probability of 
success. Both players are assumed risk neutral, but due to the competitive 
nature of the market, the lenders make zero profits. This assumption will act as a 
constraint in the maximization problem of the lender. Finally, the borrower who 
is protected by limited liability is ensured non negative transfers from the 
relationship. 
                                                          
20
 http://www.depaweb.de/StudiumDownloads/Essay4406.pdf 
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 Moreover, the project will only be financed in absence of the moral hazard 
problem. Due the zero profit condition of the investors, when the project is 
funded, the borrower receives the entire surplus. Tirole shows that a necessary 
condition to receive financing is that the break even constraint holds. This 
constraint says that if the entrepreneur’s own stake in the project is less than 
some limit depending on the severity of the moral hazard problem, the 
probability of high return and the required lending, he cannot afford to give 
incentives the agent to exert high effort (which is assumed to be the only case 
where it is possible to get financing in the first place). Thus, he will not receive 
financing. 
Adverse Selection 
An adverse selection argument for this phenomenon is that higher interest rates 
tend to attract low quality borrowers and since these low-quality borrowers 
(high-risk takers) are more likely to default on their loan, they are less affected 
by a rise in the interest rate than high quality borrowers. Therefore to keep a 
good sample of borrowers, lenders may want to keep interest rates low (Tirole 
2006). 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) proved that since it is not possible to perfectly screen 
high and low risk borrowers, banks offer the same interest rate to both of them. 
They present a model of credit rationing in which potential borrowers who are 
denied loans will not be able to borrow even if they offer to pay high interest 
rates or accepts higher collateral requirements. Their analysis implies that raising 
interest rates or increasing the requirements of collateral could reduce the 
profitability of the bank since it encourages high risk types and discourage low 
types to borrow. Moreover, banks shouldn’t use either of them as instruments to 
balance the demand of the loans with more supply. It is rather suggested to offer 
quality of loans than quantity. They conclude that in light of this situation it will 
lead to excess demand equilibria.  
However, they discuss the existence of excess supply equilibria in the market, 
where in a competitive environment banks must in order to attract good 
borrowers cut down interest rates. But a cut in an interest rate from one bank 
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would be met by an equal/lower cut by another bank. So the resulting 
equilibrium will be excess supply where no bank cuts its interest rate. 
3.2.2 Insurance 
Insurance is type of risk management where one is partially or fully protected 
against an uncertain undesired outcome. It can be further defined as transferring 
risk from one party to another. The party that sells the insurance is called an 
insurer and the party that receives it is called insuree. Insurance can be bought 
for fixed or infinite period of time. An insurer charges the insuree a risk premium 
for the protection. The risk premium can be a one-time payment or can be paid 
in installments until the insurance policy (insurance contract) comes to an end. If 
an undesirable outcome is realized when insured, the insuree receives a 
compensation (depends on type of contract).  
Moral Hazard 
The work of Pauly (1968) and Arrow (1970) brought us some economic intuition 
of moral hazard in medical industry. They concluded that individuals are free to 
indulge in any action. Furthermore, with the guarantee that insurance company 
will pay, the outcome of this will be socially inefficient. However the insurance 
company could allocate the resources to all concerned with the policy by 
rationing the quantity of medical services it will provide under the medical 
insurance. Pauly argues that insurance at times works as a subsidy21 for 
individuals, hence insurance should only be provided in cases where quantity 
demanded at zero price would equal the quantity demanded at positive price. 
This implies that complete insurance falls out if supply of insurance affects the 
demand for the services it represents. Newhouse and Taylor (1969) suggested 
that one can eliminate part of this problem by restricting the consumers’ choice 
with respect to quality of insurance, but letting them receive the subsidy 
corresponding to quantity. 22 
In the first formalization of moral hazard in the industry, Spence and Zeckhauser 
(1971) show that if an insurance company can monitor the actions or observe 
                                                          
21
 Raises their income when sick 
22
 They referred to this as “Variable cost insurance” where insuree will pay  higher premiums for 
expensive hospitals 
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the state of the nature (which the insured individual payoff is based on), then full 
risk spreading can be received and individuals will not indulge in perverse 
behavior. In absence of this monitoring facility, the optimal insurance payoff will 
always be second best.  
Holmström (1979) applies the moral hazard problem to accident insurance. He is 
formally able to show the intuition of Arrow (1970) and Pauly (1968). In case of 
an accident (case insurance materializes), the optimal outcome would entail 
deductibles (i.e., no complete insurance). Laffont and Martimort (2002) also use 
accident insurance to showcase moral hazard. They define effort of the agent as 
level of safety care. Like others, their formal model also demonstrates that in the 
presence of moral hazard, the cost incurred by the insurance company will be 
higher than in absence of moral hazard.  
Adverse Selection 
Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron (2000) study a model where the insurance 
company is not able to distinguish between the risk types. It is assumed that risk 
neutral insurees denoted by high and low risk takers are not able to influence the 
probabilities of accidents and damage, which again removes moral hazard in 
model. Moreover, high risk takers have greater probability to be in a state of 
accident than low risk takers. The paper is quite comprehensive and investigates 
adverse selection in insurance market across different levels.  They use the work 
of many academics to compile this extensive literature.  
In the case where there is only one insurance company in the market which has 
full information about the types, the optimal contract will be characterized by 
full insurance coverage, extraction of whole consumer surplus and no dead 
weight loss (no loss in efficiency). When this single period model is extended to a 
private information setting, the monopolist must offer self-selection contracts to 
the insurees which makes them reveal their true types. Here the low type will 
buy the insurance policy giving him limited protection at a low price while a high 
type will buy a full insurance. The same result was primarily shown by Stiglitz 
(1977).  
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Cooper and Hayes (1987) use experience ratings in addition to self-selection 
constraints when looking at the problem over two-periods with full commitment. 
They assume that each agent’s accidents’ history becomes known to the insurer 
after first period. This implies that the monopolist is able to raise his profits by 
offering contracts where premiums in the second period are function of history 
or damages in the first period. The resulting equilibrium contract is a separating 
one with high types getting full insurance and low risk individuals obtaining 
partial insurance. Experience rating feature of the model is very enticing for the 
potential insurers since it gives them a chance to pay lower premiums in the 
second period, given than accident does not occur.  
In another multi-period setting, Dionne (1983) uses a Stackelberg game to induce 
risk revelation than using self-selection constraints. The individual chooses a 
starting premium based on his “risk announcement”.  If the insuree reports 
himself (herself) as a low risk type then, he (she) pays a low risk premium taking 
into consideration that average damage is less than the anticipated damage 
given his (her) risk announcement. However if this does not hold he (she) has to 
pay a penalty premium.  
It is discussed in the literature that if we augment the setting with full 
commitment to a possibility of renegotiating in a finite horizon case, the self-
selection in the first period would imply inefficiency in the periods that follow 
given that the information types become public. Inefficiency would mean for 
instance that if high types were aware that renegotiation will occur, they would 
never reveal their type (Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron 2000 and Dionne, 
Doherty 1994). Hosios and Peters (1989) discuss that accident reports available 
after the second period works as a tool to reveal information about the type and 
hence can be used in renegotiation. They show that when neither party can 
commit to the contract, a separating equilibrium does not exist; only pooling and 
semi-separating equilibria are possible. 
Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron (2000) also extend the adverse selection 
problem in insurance to competitive markets. In a benchmark case with 
symmetric competition they demonstrate that insurance companies make zero 
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profit with premiums set equal to their marginal cost, there is full insurance 
coverage and insurees keep their surplus. Hence the optimal contract is first 
best. However if information is not public, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show 
that a separating equilibrium exists where high types buy full insurance while low 
types obtain only partial insurance. Moreover, the firm earns zero expected 
profit on each contract. The contract implies that high types obtain first best 
allocation, but low type receives less insurance compared to the full information 
case23. Wilson (1977) suggests an alternative approach where a firm takes into 
account the strategy/behavior of others when deciding their own strategy. For 
instance, an equilibrium can exist where firms abandon their policies after 
anticipating the reactions of other firms, such that the remaining at least break 
even.  
The literature analyzing the adverse selection problem in the insurance industry 
with competitive firms is quite vast24, and since the main aim of this section of 
our paper is only to acquaint the reader with relevant topics, we will restrict our 
discussion here and move to adverse selection in multi-period case. 
In a multi-period setting Cooper and Hayes (1987) studies two types of contracts; 
one where both parties commit to the contract referred as full commitment and 
the other where the insurees can costless switch in second period and buy the 
insurance at other available competitors referred as semi-commitment contract. 
It is shown that in the former, the optimal contract will be “qualitatively” similar 
to the monopoly case with full commitment, meaning that high types will buy full 
insurance and low type will obtain partial insurance. However, in the latter due 
to the fact that the insurees can move to other firms in the second period who 
offer single period contracts, it reduces the possibility of punishing for accidents 
in first period. They assume that entrant firms offer single period contracts 
without any information about the history of accidents or what type of contract 
was chosen by insurees. Moreover, these new firms offer contracts pertaining to 
Rothschild and Stiglitz one-period optimal contract with separating equilibrium. 
                                                          
23
 The problem is only constrained to find an optimal contract for low type.  
24
 Please see Miyazaki (1977), Riley (1979) Crocker and Snow (1985), Cho and Kreps (1987) 
Hellwig (1987)for further reading in adverse selection problem in insurance industry in 
competitive firms 
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The optimal contract for two-periods by competitive firms under semi-
commitment involves maximizing the expected utility of low types under the 
constraints of non-negative intertemporal expected profits and no-switching 
constraint. The former eliminates the possibility of cross-subsidizations between 
high and low types. Hence under the assumption that there is a Nash 
equilibrium, the optimal contract entails; high types get full insurance and low 
type gets partial insurance. High types are then indifferent between low and high 
types’ contracts while low types prefer only the contract designed for them. Thus 
both types retain their consumer surplus, and the sequential profits from high 
types are flat while on the low types, the competitive firms earn positive 
expected profits from old insurees and expected losses on new insurees.  
There exists extensive work on the situation when there is no-commitment on 
both sides. In this case both parties sign a one-period contract which will be 
followed by a conditionally optimal and experience rated second-period contract. 
It is seen in the literature that this sequential contracting with no commitment 
gives rise to ”intertemporal welfare” lower than the case with full commitment 
but higher than in the situation with repetition of static contracts without 
memory (meaning for instance accident history remains unknown to the 
insurance company) ( Kunreuther and Pauly 1985, Nilssen 1990, Fombaron 1997) 
3.2.3 Sharecropping 
Sharecropping is a system in agriculture where the landowner lets a tenant use 
the land in return for a part of production or is paid corresponding transfers for 
working on the land. Hence contracts are needed to decide the sharing attributes 
between the parties. Sharecropping has been a debatable subject where some 
have regarded it as an inefficient form of agriculture.  Basu (1984) referred to it 
as deplorable form of cultivation, the daughter of necessity and mother of misery. 
It has been long believed that due to technological advancement, sharecropping 
would soon come to an end, but it still continues to be popular form of tenancy 
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contract in developing countries and also developed countries25 (Chaudari and 
Maitra 2006). 
 
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard in agrarian economies involves a landlord acting as a principal and 
tenant as an agent.  Laffont and Martimort (2002), applied this problem to a 
setting with a monopolist and a risk neutral agent who has a limited liability. 
They compared a flexible second best contract26(criticized for not corresponding 
to agrarian economies) to a linear contract where agent is offered a fixed share 
of the realized production. They show that with a linear sharing rule, the tenant 
always benefits from positive yield on production even in the worst case. Hence 
his transfers are more than what a second best (transfers correspond to high 
output and low output) entails in a worst case i.e. zero.  
Prior to this, another interesting work was presented by Agarwal (1998) who 
uses the work of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) in a double sided moral hazard 
problem where landlord and the tenant indulge in mutual monitoring of each 
other. They show that optimal contract entails sharing a rent that maximizes the 
risk-adjusted expected output net of their risk premium and agency cost. 
Moreover, they strengthen their result through a discussion of various empirical 
results which show that agency costs which are essentially monitoring costs can 
be removed.  
Adverse selection 
From an adverse selection perspective, it is often assumed that tenants have 
different unobservable ability to produce efficiently (privately known). The 
problem was first formally modeled by Hallagan (1978) who showed that the 
very existence of firms eliminates this problem i.e. the institutional setting where 
coexistence of wages, rents and a contracts shared by the two parties produces 
                                                          
25
 Allen and Lueck (1992) discuss its existence in US mid-west. However the amount of theoretical 
and empirical work on developed nations in sharecropping reduced after 1980s.  
26
 Agent receives a wage that makes him exert high effort and principal has to give up part of his 
return generated to induce output 
Page | 41  
 
useful information such that it makes the landlord allocate resources efficiently. 
They show since the resulting wage is ratio of marginal disutility of labor to 
marginal utility of consumption/production (assumed that all consume and 
produce), this wage then can be used in order to make the tenants self-select 
themselves corresponding to their ability. This result was also shared by 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979). The primary difference between the two papers is 
the way ability was defined. Hallagan defined it as entrepreneurial ability of an 
individual making it independent of the hours used on the land, while Newbery 
and Stiglitz defined it as the efficiency of an individual in terms of output units 
produced in one hour. Their models were succeeded by Allen (1982) who 
modeled two unobservable attributes as compared to one.  His model not only 
included tenants with different abilities but also landlords with different quality 
of lands. Each of this attributes were assumed to be unobservable to the other 
party. Contracts are similar as in the Hallagan, Newbery and Stiglitz papers 
discussed above, but landlords are contracted upon the ratio of effective land to 
effective labor. If a landlord attempts to scam a tenant and claims to own a more 
effective land than he actually does, he will pay a penalty in the form of wage 
that corresponds to the type of worker that accepted the contract. Hence 
efficiency can be reached. 
3.2.4 Environmental risks 
Laffont (1995) investigates both the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection together in a case where the principal is a regulator and agent is a firm 
(efficient and inefficient) with a responsibility of a project which has a social 
value and a probability of a catastrophe both corresponding to an effort level. 
The effort level regarding catastrophe which has environmental risks can take 
two values 0 for no safety measures and 1 for taking safety measures. The 
incentive constraints are then put together such that it not only induces the firms 
to reveal their true types but also makes them to take safety measures27. In the 
case where agents are risk neutral with no limited liability, the contract entails 
that safety measures can be induced by imposing a penalty if catastrophe occurs. 
                                                          
27
 It is assumed in the model that social cost of the catastrophe is large enough, 
so regulator wants to implement safety measures irrespective of the firm type. 
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The rents promised are the same as they would have been when safety 
measures were not needed, but at lower effort levels. When the limited liability 
constraints are removed, the optimal contracts suggest a pooling equilibrium 
where rents are promised even to the most inefficient firms such that so that 
safety measures are implemented. With risk averse agents, the effort distortion 
is even more significant with higher rents paid for risk insurance and solution 
suggested is a trade-off less favorable to efficiency.  
4. The Model 
4.1 Introduction 
We consider an asset management problem which involves two types of players, 
an investor (the principal) and an investment manager (the agent). Different 
interactions between them are spread over only one period and the manager’s 
job is to manage the investor’s money by choosing a portfolio comprising of the 
assets available to him. The manager has access to two assets in the market, a 
risk-free and a risky asset. The return of the risky asset has distribution  ( )   
Prior to selecting the portfolio, the manager may observe an informative signal S, 
giving him access to the conditional distribution  ( | ). Only the manager can 
have access to S and he may then base his investment decision on a more precise 
estimate of the true value of the risky asset. This type of situation was first 
modeled by Stoughton (1993), where the informative signal received by the 
agent is contingent on the amount of effort he exerts. Our model is primarily an 
adverse selection model, where this technology is used to differentiate the types 
of the managers in the market. The problem that we investigate in our paper 
deals with designing an optimal contract that makes an hired manager choose a 
portfolio that maximizes return for the investor and also bind manager to 
truthfully report the realized returns.  
4.1.1 Information structure, Assets and Return Distribution 
We borrow the technology used by Stremme (2001), where there are two assets 
available in the market, a risk-free and a risky asset.  The gross return on the 
risky asset can take three values   ,   or   , with    >    >    , whereas the 
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gross return on the risk-free asset is         .  The signal    , where 
  *   + is assumed to take on two only values, either positive or negative. We 
further assume that following a positive signal, the return can only take the form 
of    or   . Conversely, for a negative signal returns must be either          . 
This in turn implies that after the market observes either    or   , the signal 
would be reviled with certainty.  It is also assumed that   ,          *   + is 
the unconditional probably that   will take the values    r    respectfully. The 
conditional probabilities, denoted   
 
  for      *   + are the probabilities of 
returns (  ,   or   )  given the signal   .  
Assumption 1:   The unconditional probabilities of a high and low state of nature 
are equal to each other. Formally        where      
     and     
     
Assumption 1 will occasionally be relaxed when results are qualitatively 
dependent on this distributive property. Consequently, Figure 3 and 4 illustrates 
the distribution of the risky asset and (un)conditional probabilities of different 
state of natures 
Figure 3: Two stage binomial tree illustrating distribution of the risky asset 
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Figure 4: Unconditional probabilities of different state of natures 
4.1.2 Agents - Investment Managers  
There are two kinds of managers, a good manager denoted by    and a bad 
manager denoted by   .The good manager is what we refer as high skilled and 
the bad manager as low skilled. Both managers differ in their ability to obtain 
information from the market, on which they base their investment decision. Only 
high skilled manager has the ability to obtain such information in form of a signal 
   with certainty. Since the low skilled manager does not have access to this 
information, he can be considered uninformed compared to the high skilled 
manager. Thus, he chooses his portfolio based only on the unconditional return 
probabilities.  
Assumption 2: Good managers observe an informative signal prior to choosing 
their portfolio, while bad manager must base their decision on the posterior 
probabilities. 
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The assumption above implies that a high skilled manager will always generate 
return equal or above the risk-free rate, this however is not true for the bad 
agent as he runs the risk of a failed strategy.  
However, unlike Stremme (2001) we also allow managers to use leverage at the 
risk-free rate and short sell at the market price of the risky asset. Thus, by adding 
this dimension to our model, it allows managers to have more diversity to their 
portfolio and investment decisions. 
Managers are protected by limited liability i.e. they will have to be paid positive 
transfers and can’t be punished by levying negative transfers on them. However, 
later in the thesis we will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption. 
4.1.3 Investor - Principal 
The investor has a certain amount of exogenous wealth and potentially invest 1$ 
with the hired agent.  
We assume that the investor cannot observe the actual returns generated and 
relies on the manager to report him the true returns. Because of this 
unobservability assumption, the agent could potentially steal a fraction of 
realized returns and report lower returns to the investor. We also assume that 
stealing is inefficient and manager loses part of the stolen cash. This approach is 
similar to Demarzo and Fishman (2007), and like them, we argue that this can be 
justified due to inefficient consumption.  
The principal maximizes his utility, a function of expected returns subject to the 
participation constraints, truth telling constraints, and limited liability 
constraints. This problem will be discussed in detail later in the paper. 
4.1.4 Preferences 
Assumption 3: Both managers and the investor are risk neutral with respect to 
wealth.  
As far as managers are concerned, risk neutrality plays a crucial role to highlight 
the value of information. It gives us an option to assess value in monetary terms 
without having to assume specific shapes of the utility function. Consequently, 
this allows us to analyze the model in a more tractable way. Moreover, risk 
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neutrality allows us to arrive at more explicit solutions, which further facilitates 
the focus of our thesis.  
In case of the principal, he only invests part of his wealth with a manager and 
therefore diversifies his money in various alternatives. Hence we view, risk 
neutrality on the part of the principal as a plausible assumption.  
4.1.5 The Timing of Events 
 
Figure 5: Timing of the one shot contractual game between the investor and 
managers 
We model a one shot game. There is information asymmetry between the 
investor and the managers, with only managers being fully aware of their type 
  . Given these assumptions, the game evolves as follows: 
1. At first, the investor proposes a take it or leave it contract to a manager. 
If not accepted the investor will repeat this procedure costless until the 
contract is accepted by an agent and participation is satisfied by at least 
one type and the investor. 
2. If the contract is accepted and the hired manager is a good type then he 
receives information from the market and his portfolio choices are then 
established upon the conditional return probabilities. But if a bad 
manager is employed, he does not have access to such information and 
his portfolio choices are based purely on the unconditional return 
probabilities.  
3. The returns  ( )  are realized 
4. Manager reports  ̃ 
5.  Manager is paid the transfers ( ̃) 
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4.2 Portfolio selection and strategies 
In this section we state several conditions for optimal portfolio selection both for 
the investor and the manager. The manager will, since he is risk neutral, select 
the portfolio that maximizes his expected transfers. For the investor on the other 
hand, the optimal portfolio maximizes the expected net portfolio return. Since 
both players are risk neutral, this alignment problem is costless for the investor. 
Nevertheless, he must consider certain properties in the mechanism design such 
that this holds regardless of strategy. These properties and strategies will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
First a brief recapture of the possible trading strategies and limitations available 
to the manager. For any manager (   ), there exists a risk free asset yielding 
the safe return    and a risky asset taking one of three values (        ). The 
precise distribution of the risky asset is described in detail in section (4.1.1). After 
receiving the ex-ante signal    (if the manager is good), the manager selects how 
much to invest in the risky asset. We allow for both short-selling and leverage 
(though under restrictions  (      )) to increase the benefit of obtaining ex-
ante additional information about the state of nature. Conversely, the bad 
manager’s uniformed strategies will simply be based with regard on assuming a 
realized value of the signal   .  
Definition 1: The bad manager has two viable strategies which we denote: 
Leverage mimicking strategy: The manager acts as he has received a 
positive signal when selecting his portfolio. 
Short-sale mimicking strategy: The manager acts as he has received a 
negative signal when selecting his portfolio. 
For the most part of this thesis, we will only derive results for one of these 
strategies, unless it is qualitatively important to consider them both. This is 
because many of the results we derive will simply be mirrored in a converse 
strategy. As we show later, the marginal return with respect to ‘ ’ following a 
successful implementation of a strategy will have significant influence on the 
implementation of an optimal compensation scheme. With this in mind, we now 
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turn our attention to two specific cases of the distribution. We will use graphical 
arguments to see the conditions at which each strategy constitutes the 
maximum portfolio return. These illustrations are given in Figure 6 and 7. 
Obviously, a good manager will never fall beneath    in any case. However a bad 
manager could, given that his strategy turned out ex-post wrong, generate 
significant losses for the investor. 
Figure 6: Portfolio return when maximum return is given by a short strategy 
 
Figure 7: Portfolio return when maximum return is given by a leverage strategy 
 
The wage function mapping these gross returns into transfers to the agent is 
denoted ( ). For now we don’t assume any particular structure on ( ), but 
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we will discuss what conditions on this mapping function that leads to optimal 
portfolio selection for the investor. With this in mind we state our first 
proposition: 
Proposition 1 Let ( ) be the function mapping return to transfer and let it be 
increasing in all    . Furthermore, let the truth telling constraint (1.1) be 
satisfied for all   
1. Following a positive signal, the high skilled manager selects the 
portfolio (       ) and If he receives a negative signal, he selects the 
portfolio (        ), i.e., he shorts the risky asset and invests all in the 
safe asset. 
2. The bad manager will if       ( )  ( )⁄⁄  follow the leverage 
mimicking strategy and follow the short-sale mimicking strategy 
otherwise. 
Proof: See appendix A1 
Arguably, the manager will consider the possible gain from reporting a low 
return and stealing the difference when selecting his portfolio, but as we shall 
see in section (4.3), in equilibrium the wage function will satisfy truthful 
revelation of the gross return. Moreover, even if this was not the case, he will 
still be best off by maximizing the difference between the realized return and the 
lowest supported return. Hence he will still maximize expected gross return.  
Moreover, if  ( )   , such that (  )   (  ) for some I and j, and    or 
   constitutes the maximum of return, there may not be a unique solution to the 
problem. Suppose for instance, the manager will be paid a fixed fee with a bonus 
over some benchmark. Such a compensation structure can be described formally 
as: 
 (     )       *   + 
 *   + is an indicator function taking the value 1 when return exceeds the 
benchmark and 0 otherwise. If      then any portfolio except the short selling 
strategy is optimal for both managers following a good signal.  Following a bad 
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signal, any portfolio with   ,     )  is optimal. We will however not consider 
such compensation schemes to a large extent.  
An important feature of this model setup is the value of accessing additional 
information above what the market has priced in. The uninformed investor will 
in fact always generate less (or equal) return than the informed manager. This is 
stated formally in proposition 2. 
Suppose now that the manager follows the optimal portfolio strategy for the 
investor. In this case, the expected conditional and unconditional returns are 
summarized in table 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected return Probability 
(    )            
  
       
      
  
(    )            
  
Expected return Probability 
(    )            
  
       
      
  
(    )            
  
Table 1: Expected return of a good manager 
Table 2: Expected return of a bad manager following strategy 𝓛 
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Proposition 2: The expected gross return of a good manager exceeds that of a 
bad regardless of strategy and this difference increases in allowed leverage and 
short selling. 
Proof: See appendix A2 
It is clear the investor would like to design a contract which provides the 
incentives for unique optimal portfolio selection. Proposition 1, gives some 
structure to the wage function and we see that this corresponds well to usual fee 
structures in the industry such as such as asymmetrical bonus contracts with or 
without a hurdle rate, or contracts which are simply linear in return. However, 
although these conditions are sufficient for optimal portfolio selection, they are 
not necessary. In the next proposition, we attempt to put more structure on a 
general wage function yielding optimal selection for the investor. 
Proposition 3: Let         ((   ) 
    ) be the maximum possible value 
of gross portfolio return. The wage at      must be strictly larger than all other 
returns to achieve optimal portfolio selection. 
Proof: See appendix A 3 
Proposition 3 implies that the investor is allowed to write a compensation 
scheme which need not be strictly increasing in R to achieve optimal selection, 
thus providing him with more flexibility when considering the agents 
participation constraints. 
Expected return Probability 
(    )            
  
       
      
  
(    )            
  
Table 3: Expected return of a bad manager following strategy 𝓢 
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4.3 Unobservable cash-flow 
In this model, the investor cannot observe the return generated and thus must 
rely on the return reported by the agent. To account for this we assume that 
given the true realized return  ( ) the manager can report  ̃( ) and steal the 
difference. However, in the process of doing this some of the funds are lost to 
both the agent, and he only gets away with a fraction. We denote the fraction 
lost by   and treat it as exogenous (i.e. neither the principal nor the agent can 
influence the size of  ).  
Assume now that all conditions on ( ̃) satisfy optimal portfolio selection. We 
then know that from our simple distribution, only four outcomes are possible. 
From this point on in the thesis we will assume this hold and then later check if 
the wage function satisfies the conditions for optimal selection. Table 4 
summarizes these returns as well as introduces some simplifying notation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, if the investor request truth telling, he must take into account the 
following maximization problem for the manager: 
  ̃         ( ̃)  (   )   (     ̃) (1.1)  
Here  ̃ is the reported return and   is the actual realized return. The last max 
operator is present due to the fact that the manager cannot use his own wealth 
Return Notation 
(    )         ( ) 
    ( ) 
(    )         ( ) 
(    )         ( ) 
(    )         (  ) 
Table 4: Outcomes under optimal portfolio selection 
Page | 53  
 
to boost the return in order to achieve higher wage28. Although portfolio return 
is defined continuously, our simple distribution of the risky asset and assumption 
of optimal portfolio selection implies we can simplify the truth telling condition 
for computational purposes. Hence, condition (1.1), which implies an infinite 
number of truth telling constraints can be expressed as the only relevant cases 
(i.e. the only possible realized returns). We now attempt so solve explicitly for 
the conditions of optimal truth telling.   
To solve for the conditions that ensure truth telling, we must first find what the 
lowest possible return is. The two candidates are: 
1. The agent can choose maximum leverage and invest in the risky asset 
such that the portfolio return is (    )         
2. The agent can choose a maximum short strategy and get the return: 
(    )         
The investor must consider these two cases when designing the contract as they 
will define a minimum payment he must promise the manager in different 
reported states. Hence, we have two cases to consider. To summarize, case 1 is 
the lowest possible return if the following condition holds. If not, then case 2 is 
the lowest possible return the manager can generate. 
 
     
 
    (1.2)  
Case 1: Lower bound of return is given by a failed leverage strategy 
Let’s now assume that condition (1.2) hold. We know that the maximum return 
possible is given by shorting the risky asset and invest in the risk-free asset. If this 
is indeed the case, it must be so that the manager truthfully report ̃(      ) 
and not  (     ) if the following truth telling constraint is satisfied. 
  ( ( ))   ( ( ))  (   )(     )    (1.3)  
                                                          
28
 If, for instance, the manager faces a convex compensation scheme such as described in the 
portfolio selection section, the manager have both the incentive and opportunity to boost the 
return with his own saving when he is marginally below the bonus benchmark rate. 
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With this condition we can now show that the investor will always request truth. 
The least cost condition for truth implementation is to bind (1.3). Hence, what 
the investor is left with after compensating the manager is:  
 
 ( ( ))  (    )         ( ( ))
 (   )(     )    
(1.4)  
While if the agent lies and reports low return, the value of the fund after fees is: 
  ( ( ))  (    )         ( ( )) (1.5)  
Subtracting (1.5) from (1.4) we get:  
  (     )    (     )(   ) 
This is always true as long as      . Moreover, since this holds when the 
agents can steal the largest return in case 1, we conclude that it must be so that 
the investor will always prefer truth telling, regardless of realized return. This is 
intuitive as stealing is inefficient (part of the profit is “lost” by the agent). 
Definition 2 summarizes the four relevant truth-telling conditions for case 1. 
Definition 2: For
      
 
   , the following four truth-telling conditions must be 
satisfied in equilibrium.  
  ( ( ))   ( ( ))  (   )(     )    
  ( )   ( ( ))  (   )(     )   
  ( ( ))   ( ( ))  (   )(     )   
  ( (  ))   ( ( ))  (   )(         )   
These conditions constitute a floor at which compensation cannot fall beneath. 
How, and if this implies additional costs for the investor, will be addressed later 
in the thesis under section  (4.5). 
Case 2: Lower bound of return is given by short selling strategy 
In case two, the highest possible return is defined by a max leverage strategy and 
the realization of    while the lowest return is given by a short sale strategy and 
the realization of   . Truth telling is always desired if   (     )  
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  (     )(   ). This is, for the same reasons as above, always true. Thus, 
we summarize the conditions for truth-telling in definition 3. 
Definition 3: For
      
 
   , the following four truth-telling conditions must be 
satisfied in equilibrium.  
  ( )   ( (  ))  (   )(     )    
  ( )   ( (  ))  (   )(     )   
  ( )   ( (  ))  (   )(     )   
  ( )   ( (  ))  (   )(         )   
For a good manager, only return    is relevant, while for the bad manager, 
these conditions must hold for all the support of  . One may think that this 
rationalizes the use of a linear sharing rule above a benchmark, but this would be 
wrong. In fact, this is simply a construct by the distribution. One thing worth 
considering however is the case where the distribution of returns is unbounded 
(e.g. if the risky asset    (   )). In this case we can think of the relevant bound 
being such that the value of the fund is 0. We believe a more natural and 
intuitive explanation would be that the non-verifiable output assumption must 
be put into a context where the reporting of extreme portfolio returns would 
imply some sort of reputational effects on the market’s perception of the 
manager, and this would hurt his continuation utility. However, this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis and we only consider it as a possible extension in section 
(5). 
4.4 Participation 
Any contract proposed by the investor and accepted by the agent must provide 
expected utility to each of the players greater than their reservation utility. Let    
and    be the reservation utilities of the good and bad manager respectfully, 
where        . The investor has the outside option to invest on his own 
behalf in the risk-free asset, yielding the safe return   . Hence, the investor will 
never propose a contract which does not satisfy his participation constraint: 
  [ ( ̃)   ( ̃)]     (1.6)  
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Since the agents learn their type before signing the contract we have the 
following two participation constraints: 
  [ ( ̃|   )]     (1.7)  
and 
  [ ( ̃|   )]     (1.8)  
We see from these expressions that we implicitly assume that the manager 
rationally assumes truth-telling. The positive reservation utility of the bad 
manager deserves some explanation. We can think of this as managers having 
specific market knowledge and good managers are the selection of managers 
with specialized knowledge of the market under consideration, while bad 
managers are the homogenized pool of managers with expertise in different 
areas. 
 Moreover, these conditions imply some possible difficulties for the investor 
when designing the contract. First, if the difference in reservation utilities is 
large, a shutdown contract for the inefficient type may not be feasible. That is, all 
contracts satisfying the investor’s participation constraint (1.6) and the 
participation constraint of the efficient manager may also satisfy the 
participation constraint of the inefficient type. It may also be such that, due to 
the information asymmetry with respect to skill, the investor cannot promise the 
efficient type expected utility that satisfy his participation constraint. This is the 
classical adverse selection argument where the bad drive out the good. Each of 
these cases will be discussed in the next section.  
4.5 Equlibrium outcomes 
4.5.1 First best: Observable skill and observable cash flow 
Assumption 4: The investor prefers to hire the efficient manager. That is we 
assume the surplus under efficient management exceeds that of inefficient given 
by the condition:  (  |      )   (  |      )        where      is the 
optimal portfolio for the investor. 
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We first consider the benchmark case of full information. That is, the investor 
can observe both the return generated and the type of the manager. In this case 
there is no longer a tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency. Only good 
managers are hired and bad managers are left with their reservation utility   . 
Hence, the investor can disregard the truth telling constraint (or set of 
constraints) and the participation constraint for the low type. He is then left with 
the following maximization problem: 
    
 ( ) (  ) ( )
 ,   ( )- 
s.t  [ ( ̃|   )]     
          (      )  , (   )- 
and  ( )       
(1.9)  
We assume that if the manager in optimum has a range of portfolios satisfying 
his maximization problem, he will just simply invest in the safest one. For 
instance, a compensation scheme where the investor pays the manager a fixed 
wage of    binds the participation constraint, but it is neither optimal nor 
feasible as the expected return of the portfolio falls to    and the investor is left 
with        
 . In fact, the manager must receive a strictly positive return 
following both a successful short selling and leverage strategy. One possible 
optimal contract is summarized in proposition (4). 
Proposition 4: Let the maximization problem of the investor be defined by (1.9), 
the following contract then efficiently implements first best for the investor: 
  ( )         * ( )  ( )+ 
 ( )      (   )
   
  
,  ( )      (   )
(   )  
  
 for   (   - and 
  {
0
  
     
  1        (    )       
0  
  
     
1        (    )       
 
Proof: See appendix A 4 
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An important assumption in proposition 4 is that the manager and investor can 
fully commit to the contract. Suppose this is not the case and setting    , then 
following a positive signal, the manager must be promised: ( )       
 ⁄  and 
 ( )       
 ⁄  with a bad signal. Suppose now that we are indeed in the 
situation where     (    )       . For     
  the investor who has 
all the bargaining power, reduces his promise to the agent, again leaving him 
with 0 rent. Conversely, if     
 , he must increase his promise to ensure 
participation by the agent. To describe the complete set of contracts 
implementing first best we use graphical argumentation  
Figure 8: Feasible contracts implementing first best 
 
First, notice that this graph assumes the case where maximum return is defined 
by positive leverage strategy. But the contracting problem where the maximum 
is given by a successful shorting strategy completely mirrors this, so it is sufficient 
to discuss the problem under one case.  The only thing the investor needs to 
worry about in this first best scenario is to provide the manager with expected 
utility equal to his reservation utility and to give him incentives to choose the 
portfolio which maximizes expected return. Now, assume the manager has 
received a negative signal, according to proposition 3, the manager will chose the 
optimal portfolio for the investor if  ( ( ))   ( ( ))     . Thus, as we 
can see from figure 8, point C constitutes a conditional maximum.   
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Now consider the case where the manager has received a positive signal. The 
requirement for optimal portfolio choice is the same as for the negative signal 
(i.e. the maximum payment must be promised in the maximum return case). We 
immediately see that this gives the investor some flexibility when mapping the 
returns from point B -> A in the figure, as the only requirement is that they are 
strictly less than     (   )     
 ⁄ . Also notice that this only constitutes a 
roof on the payments in this interval. In fact, the investor could reduce them to 
as low as    .  
The payment given at point A is the roof of all transfers (we do not allow 
negative transfers). Hence, if the manager reduces this payment by increasing  , 
he must make sure this will not increase the payment in a successful short 
strategy by so much it becomes the unconditional maximum. The reason for this 
is that if  ( ) is indeed the maximum following a leverage strategy, then the 
return  ( ) must be feasible in an interior leverage strategy which is not 
optimal for the investor as shown in proposition 3. 
Finally, the straight (curved) lines going from     ( ) is an example of a 
linear and quadratic compensation scheme over the hurdle rate   , indicating 
that it should be possible for the investor to achieve first best with such a 
compensation structure.  
4.5.2 Second best: Observable type, non-observable cash flow   
As in the first best, only good managers are hired, but now the investor must also 
consider the truth telling condition (1.1) when designing the contract. Thus, the 
problem for the investor is: 
 
   
 ( ) (  ) ( )
 [   ( ̃)] 
s.t  [ ( ̃|   )]      
          (      )  , (   )- 
 ̃         ( ̃)  (   )   (     ̃) 
and  ( ̃)      ̃ 
(1.10)  
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In the first best case, the investor was able to extract all rent from the manager, 
but now this may no longer be the case. This is because, as discussed above, the 
truth telling condition implies a floor for the payments in all positive states 
(including the    state). 
Proposition 5: In the case where the investor can observe types but not cash 
flow, the following contract describe the equilibrium outcome 
 Case1:           ⁄   ( ̃)       ̃  * ( )  ( )  ( )+ 
 ( )     (   )(     )     ( )     (   )(   
  )    ( )  (   )(     )   where       {      ( |  )} 
 Case2:          ⁄   ( ̃)       ̃  * ( )  ( )  ( )+ 
 ( )     (   )(     )   ( )     (   )(     )   
  ( )     (   )(     )   where       {      ( |  )} 
Proof: See appendix A 5 
For a more general discussion about the set of feasible optimal contracts, we 
again use graphical arguments. Figure 9 represents an illustration of contracts 
satisfying optimality. 
Figure 9: Feasible contracts when cash flow is unobservable 
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As we can see from figure 9 implementing a second best contract is more 
difficult for the investor. He now faces floor payments on three cases instead of 
two as where the case before. Still, the requirements for optimal portfolio 
selection remain the same. As long as transfers in point A is larger than all other 
transfers and transfers in point B is larger than all transfers for reported Y less 
than (    )       .   In this figure, participation is ensured by varying   , 
which can be interpreted as a fixed fee. Alternatively, the investor could just add 
a term to the three relevant states. Suppose he adds       to the       states. 
He can then ensure participation if       
         . However, if the 
manager were risk averse, a fixed fee would dominate the latter strategy.  
Since this is the implementation of a second best contract the more interesting 
case with respect to agency cost is that when    is equal to zero.  The size of the 
agency cost will depend on the outside option for the high skilled manager 
relative to the fraction he can steal upon realizing return  .  
4.5.3 Second best: Hidden type, observable cash flow   
Since the investor can no longer simply select the high type to manage his assets, 
but depending on the outside options of the managers, he may be able to screen 
the good manager by offering a contract that will be accepted by the productive 
high type, but rejected by the low type. However, if this is not the case, he must 
generally pay a rent to the low type to ensure participation of the high type as 
shown below. The participation constraint is binding in equilibrium, hence we 
can use proposition 4 to derive the conditions at which the investor is able 
screen the good managers.  
Theorem 1: There exists a contract which is accepted by the high type and 
declined by the low type if the following condition is satisfied. 
 When the optimal strategy for the bad type is given by a leverage 
strategy, the investor can reach first best when: 
     (  
  
  
*     
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 When the optimal strategy for the bad type is given by a short-sale 
strategy, the investor can reach first best when: 
     (  
  
  
)     
  
  
  
               
 
Proof: See appendix A 6 
Comparing these results to the proposition given in Stremme (2001), we see that 
allowing for short selling and leverage strengthen the investors position in 
screening the good agents. The reason is, he can now make some of his promises 
to the good agent contingent on the state impossible for the bad agent to reach. 
We call this state the separation state for further reference. That is, in these 
states he must only consider the roof of payments given by the optimal portfolio 
conditions.  
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is that maximum utility the investor can promise 
the good agent and still satisfy optimal portfolio selection in any case is twice 
that of a bad manager.  If, however the distribution is such that the probability of 
reaching the desired state for the bad manager (for example the    state with a 
leverage strategy) is large relative to the undesired state, the screening condition 
tightens as  he is forced to reduce payment in the attractive state (and thus also 
in the separation state). 
To further explain the accepted range on the good agents reservation that allows 
for separation we refer to figure 1029. We see that if    lies in the triangle A, the 
investor can potentially construct a contract that is accepted by the good 
manager and rejected by the bad. Once,    approaches    however, the 
condition reaches its maximum and stays there for all      .  
                                                          
29
 This is only for when it is optimal for the bad manager to employ the leverage strategy. Since 
the case when he selects the short sale strategy completely mirrors this, we only included it in 
the appendix 
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Figure 10: Conditions for screening the good managers 
 
Theorem 1 implies that since the condition is either regulated by the optimal 
portfolio condition or the strategy constraint for the bad guy, there is always a 
possibility of shutdown of the least efficient type as long as       . The reason 
is simply that if the distribution and wage function is defined such that this is not 
true, then it is possible to change the wage function in a way so it is optimal for 
the bad manager to change his strategy (or potentially shutting him down) 
without compromising the participation of the efficient type. 
4.5.4 Unobservable types and cash-flow when managers can delegate active 
management. 
In this part we present a version of the model which includes both unobservable 
cash flow and hidden type. There is a continuum of agents normalized to  . The 
probability of randomly selecting a good manager is given by  (   )    and 
for the low guy (   )      . As before the high guy possesses an 
informative advantage relative to the low skilled manager in for of the signal   , 
but all managers, regardless of type is more informed than the investor. To 
clarify, all managers observe both their own type and all other types in the 
market, as well as returns generated by other managers. This means that a 
potentially viable strategy for the bad agent may be to mimic the behavior of the 
investor and simply reinvest with a good manager. We assume that the minimum 
cost to ensure truth telling also implies that the participation constraint for the 
high guy is slack (i.e. the investor must pay a rent to the high type).  
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Figure 11: Timing in the case with delegation 
 
Proposition 6: When the investor cannot observe cash-flow, there exist a 
contract that will be actively managed by the high guy, but not by the low guy if 
the following conditions hold: 
    (    
 ⁄ )    ( 
 )   
where (  )  
  (   )
  
((     )(     )  (     )) 
Proof: See appendix A7 
We see that  (  ) is generally decreasing in   . The reason is that with hidden 
cash-flow, the bad agent will be promised positive transfers in states  ( ) and 
 ( ). Thus, the wage at   ( ) must be reduced accordingly to avoid the bad 
type signing the contract. Obviously now the requirements are no longer just on 
the difference in reservation utilities between the managers, but also on the 
reservation utility of the bad manager relative to the fraction he can steal. That 
is, binding all truth telling conditions may automatically imply participation. 
Furthermore, this result is given as a proposition and not a theorem as in section 
4.5.3. The reason is that the investor could propose a contract where the wage 
for the low guy won’t satisfy truth-telling in the separation state (i.e., he could 
set  ( )        ). We now see that the only condition for screening is the 
wage to the efficient type in the separation state. But this is the same problem as 
in section 4.5.3 with the solution       .  We can consider out of equilibrium 
behavior by assuming the good manager reports the largest return  ( ). He is 
then paid 0, but inefficiently steals (   )( ( )   ( )). But, by truthfully 
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reporting  ( ) he receives at least (   )( ( )   (  )) which is always 
larger. Hence, if       , there will exist a contract accepted only by efficient 
managers and it will satisfy truth telling for all realistic reported return). 
But what if we relax the assumption that      ?. In this case we could be in a 
situation where       ( )  ( )⁄⁄ , but  ( )   ( ). This is not 
unreasonable and can be true for many situations where extreme losses are 
huge in absolute value relative to extreme gains, but less likely to happen30. Now, 
to ensure that the good types don’t select an interior portfolio (see proposition 
3), the investor must promise higher transfers following a reported  ( ) than 
 ( ). But now, the wage  ( ) is no longer constrained by the participation 
condition of the bad manager. The bad manager will accept all contracts 
satisfying truth-telling if the following condition holds: 
   (     )  (    )(     )  
  
  (   )
 (1.11)  
Assume now that (1.11) does not hold. The investor could then offer a contract 
where he rewards the good manager for employing a successful shorting 
strategy, and this bonus will not be bounded upwards by optimal portfolio 
selection criteria, but rather the strategy implementation criteria of the bad 
manager (see proposition 1). Hence, if the probability of the catastrophe case is 
sufficiently small relative to the probability of positive excessive return over the 
risk free rate, the investor could take advantage of this rare state when designing 
the contract. This shows the dilemma for a potential regulator with respect to 
the restriction on short selling   . He cannot increase    such that (1.1) hold, but 
by increasing it marginally below, he also increases the potential extra utility the 
investor can promise the good agent relative to the bad agent.   
Our next step is to consider the value of mimicking the investor for the bad 
agent. If he chooses to do so, he can take advantage of the information 
advantage he has over the uniformed investor to reduce the rent given to the 
good manager. For the investor on the other hand he will pay for the 
participation of the good manager and truth telling for the bad one.  
                                                          
30
 For instance, if  ( ) represent a chatostrophy state 
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Proposition 7: Both the investor and the bad manager prefers delegation when 
the following conditions holds: 
 ,       -     
 [        
  ]    
Proof: See appendix A8 
From assumption 4, Proposition 7 Indirectly implies that delegation is always 
preferable. This is also an efficient outcome as the capital is now managed by the 
more productive high type. But will this state always be reached? We first use 
proposition 3 to obtain explicit results for both a leverage and a short-sale 
strategy for the bad manager. 
    ,
  ( ( )   (  ))                          
  ( ( )   ( ))                        
 (1.12)  
Until now we have assumed that the bad managers have perfect information 
about the asset management industry. We now relax this assumption and state 
that he believes the probability of selecting a good manager is     . In real 
terms we can view this as the bad managers have through his experience gained 
knowledge of some other bad managers and are able to screen them out. We 
also relax the assumption that bad managers can observe returns. Hence, he 
must also consider optimal truth telling when designing the contract. So for a 
bad manager, the expected wage he receives when managing the portfolio 
himself is, as before: 
 ( |   )   [(     )(   )] 
Before proceeding we need to define some important informational restrictions 
in the model. 
Assumption 5 Bad manager are totally homogenous with respect to the 
information they have about the market. That is, all bad managers believe the 
probability of randomly selecting a good manager from the pool of managers is 
equal to    
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Although assumption 5 is a strict assumption it is important to the tractability of 
the model and it does not compromise the validity or reliability of our results. 
The important thing is that each step of delegation is costly to the investor. 
If the bad manager delegates the portfolio, there is a probability that he will get 
unlucky and select a bad manager, if he does, the selected manager will simply 
delegate the management to another manager and this keeps going until a good 
manager has been selected. For each new delegation, the new manager must be 
promised utility such that he has the incentive to tell the truth. The next theorem 
describes the conditions for when delegation is optimal for a bad manager: 
Theorem 2: Let   be the wage that ensures optimal truth telling from a good 
manager. Then, a bad manager will delegate the management of the portfolio if 
the following condition holds: 
   ,   -              
(   )   
(  (   ) ) 
 
Proof: See Appendix A9 
Theorem 2 states that the manager will delegate the active management as long 
as expected return from a good manager is sufficiently large such that it at least 
covers the expected additional cost resulting from potential several steps of 
delegation. To obtain further insight into the role of K, we employ some 
comparative statics. 
Comparative statics 
 
  
   
 
     
(  (    ) ) 
 
 (    )    
(  (    ) ) 
   
  
  
  
(    )  
(  (    ) ) 
 
  (    )  (    )
(  (    ) ) 
   
(1.13)  
We see that K is increasing in the probability of finding a good manager and 
decreasing in the potential stolen share of the profit. This is intuitive since a 
greater probability of finding a good manager reduces the number of payments 
being made to different managers, and an increase in the potential stolen 
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amount reduces K as for a given probability    investors (both the true and 
mimicking investors) must promise their agents a larger amount of the return. 
 
    
    
  (   )     
    
    
  (   )     
   
(   ) 
 
(1.14)  
From (1.14) we can confirm that as the searching skill of a bad manager 
approaches perfection, the return generated by him approaches second best. 
Moreover, as the probability of finding a good manager approaches zero, the bad 
manager must pay an expected fee which is the sum of an infinite payments to 
other delegated manager. To see this, consider the payments being made in 
delegation n. This must be: 
∑    
 
   
 ∑      
 
   
 ∑     
 
   
 
   
   
 
    
   
   
    
   
 
   
(   ) 
 
 
    
   
     
    
   
   
(1.15)  
Naturally, if the fraction of potential stolen return goes to zero, return goes to 
first best. But, it is important to see that we have implicitly assumed that 
satisfying truth-telling also ensures participation. We see that in this case, this is 
a very unrealistic assumption. More likely, the limit will rather be a function of 
the reservation utilities of the bad managers. The last condition is more intuitive. 
It says that when manager can steal almost all the return, gross return will be 
driven to the lowest possible reported return.  
Ownership structure 
Suppose now that theorem 2 holds. In this case a bad manager can do better by 
delegating the management of the assets under his control than to actively 
manage them himself. If we now relax the assumption of zero initial wealth of 
the manager and assume he will seek active management on a fraction of this 
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initial wealth throughout the period (the rest is left for continuous consumption 
etc). A good manager will then always manage his own money. If he did not, then 
there must be some manager in the market with greater alpha generating ability. 
A bad manager can potentially invest in his own fund to mimic the good 
manager. Thus, for ownership to be a credible signal, the following condition 
must hold: 
 ,(   )(     )-   ( |  ) 
  is the fraction of wealth put away for consumption when total initial wealth is 
normalized to 1. Thus, when the difference in skill is sufficiently large or the bad 
managers are highly skilled in selecting good managers, ownership can be used 
as a credible signal. In this case only good managers will be left in the market, 
but the bad managers still play an important role. They will ensure that joint 
ownership is maintained in equilibrium as if this is relaxed, it will once again be 
profitable for the bad managers to enter the market.  
A potential problem is if the bad managers are heterogeneous in their ability to 
screen the market for bad manager (i.e   (   )).  Now delegation may be 
optimal for some agents, while self-active management for others. However, this 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5. Conclusions: Implications and limitations 
Our analysis is consistent with the observed industry practice where active 
managers potentially can receive large fees for their services despite the stylized 
fact that they generally underperform their passive benchmark. We argue that 
one potential reason for this could be due to agency costs resulting from 
asymmetric information between the investor and the managers. Moreover, we 
show that it may not always be feasible for the investor to construct a shutdown 
contract of the inefficient type if difference in outside options between types is 
too great. This could be argued is due to sector specific knowledge dividing the 
managers.  
Our analysis provides some rationale for the existence of financial advisers in the 
asset management market. We show that when manager have additional 
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knowledge about the distribution of types, low skilled manager may have an 
incentive of simply mimicking the investor and delegate the active management 
to another manager. Moreover, in social terms this would be efficient as the 
capital available for management is scarce and high skilled managers generate in 
expectations larger return than a poor skilled manager. 
We also make an argument for the allowance of trading strategies such as short 
selling or use of leverage in the case where there is a small probability for 
catastrophic losses. Bad managers will to a less degree be able to receive ex-ante 
information about the asset(s) currently trading in the market and hence they 
will benefit less from employing these conditional strategies. Thus, by increasing 
the bound of short-selling/leverage, the condition for screening managers 
relaxes. However, in general the effects from varying short-selling restrictions are 
somewhat ambiguous and very dependent on the distribution. If for instance, a 
leverage strategy is dominating for the bad manager both in terms of expected 
utilty and in potential maximum payout, increasing short-selling makes the 
screening problem more difficult. The reason is the upward bound in the state 
where the good manager is able to differentiate himself is restricted by the 
participation condition of the bad guy while the lower bound of the transfers in 
the “bad” state (e.g.  ( ) ) will be increasing in the fraction the manager can 
steal. Since only the difference in these two wages matter when comparing the 
reservation utilities of the managers with respect to shutdown of the inefficient 
type, short-selling actually makes a first best implementation more difficult31 
Nevertheless, our simple technology and assumptions leads to several points 
where the model could potentially be enriched to achieve more realistic 
predictions. Adding more assets available for investment could potentially 
increase the value of the signal received by the manager. In this case, he can 
then employ a more sophisticated strategy conditioned on several signals. 
Another possibility is to make the managers (and potentially also the principal) 
risk averse. This would add to the realism of the model, but make it significantly 
less tractable. It will no longer be optimal for the manager to take on an extreme 
                                                          
31
 First best with respect to only efficient managers are employed 
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position in his portfolio selection, but rather an interior solution conditioned on 
the signal he receives (or assumes), his degree of risk aversion and on the 
mechanism design. The problem for the investor is that it is no longer simply a 
question of efficiency, but also optimal risk sharing. That is, he must give up rent 
to the risk averse manager to make sure he makes the efficient choices. A natural 
consequence of this would be to relax the assumption of hidden cash-flow and 
introduce a more traditional moral hazard interpretation (see Stoughton 2003).  
In our model, we only have two types of managers in the market, and each type 
is homogenous with respect to market knowledge. One could potentially 
increase the number of types or make them continuous over some interval. If 
this was the case then unique knowledge about the distribution of types would 
also be implied. Another possible implication of adding more types is the 
possibility of an equilibrium where some of the bad managers works as a 
financial advisor and the rest actively manages both investments and own 
wealth. 
We could also transform the model from a static to a dynamic model and include 
learning. In this case the investor could take advantage of the dynamic nature of 
return and make the bonus conditional on the history of return. In this respect, 
this would also allow us to analyze potential career concerns and reputational 
effects in the market. One possibility is to include decreasing returns to scale and 
in a market where investors have limited information, attempt to find an 
equilibrium which is comparable to the stylized fact that returns is generally 
inconsistent.   
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7. Appendices 
A1 Proof of proposition 1 
Suppose a high skilled manager has observed a positive signal, the expected 
return given his portfolio weights is then: 
    , ( )-    
  (     )     (1.16)  
Where     is the expectations operator, conditioned on observing the signal  
 . 
The manager has the following maximization problem 
 
   
 
   , (   )- 
s.t.  
         
(1.17)  
Let   ( ) and   ( ) be the maximum expected value of   parameterized by 
the portfolio weight  . We see from (1.?) that: 
 
    , ( )-
  
   (1.18)  
From this we see, by employing the envelope theorem that: 
 
     
 ( )
  
 
     (   )
  
|
    ( )
   (1.19)  
Hence     
 ( ) is maximized at   . Conversely, if he observes a bad signal the 
expected conditional return is: 
    , ( )-    
  (     )     (1.20)  
And we have: 
 
   
 
   , (   )- 
s.t.  
         
(1.21)  
Using the same notation, we have that: 
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    , ( )-
  
   (1.22)  
And 
 
     
 ( )
  
 
     (   )
  
|
    ( )
   (1.23)  
We see that the manager reduces his exposure to the risky asset and invests all 
funds in the risk-free asset without leverage, thus proving the first part of the 
proposition.  
For the second part, consider the bad agent. He does not receive any signal and 
must thus only rely on the prior probabilities. We first denote the unconditional 
probabilities of       and    as       and   respectfully.  
The bad manager has two possible optimal strategies: 
Strategy 1, mimic the leverage strategy: In this strategy the bad manager 
assumes the realization of    and act according to this. Thus, he will implement 
the portfolio (       ). 
Strategy 2, mimic the short-sale strategy: In this strategy the bad manager 
assumes the realization of    and act according to this, implementing the 
portfolio (        ) 
We now attempt to find the conditions at which these strategies are optimal. 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the negative state at each 
strategy gives the wage 0 (this only means that the lowest possible return is not 
yielding a bonus for the agent). Thus, we can write the expected utility following 
each of these strategies as 
 ( )     ( )     ( ) For the leverage strategy 
 ( )     ( )     ( ) For the shorting strategy 
Calculating the difference between these two expectations gives the condition 
for optimality and we see that it is optimal to employ a leverage strategy if: 
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 ( )
 ( )
 (1.24)  
From assumption 1, we see that this implies that he will employ the strategy 
which gives the highest wage in the high return state. 
  
A2 Proof of proposition 2 
We subtract     , - from     , - and get: 
    
 ((    )        (    )       ) 
Simplifying and we get the condition showing this must be positive and 
increasing in   : 
      (     )    (1.25)  
Moreover, if the bad manager selects the short sale strategy, we get a similar 
result: 
      (     )    (1.26)  
 
  
A3 Proof of proposition 3 
We want to show that if this condition does not hold, the manager will select an 
interior solution to the portfolio problem and not maximize expected return. 
Suppose a skilled manager is hired and maximum return is given by a positive 
leverage strategy. That is,  ( )   ( )    . Now let transfers in these three 
states be defined by  ( )   ( )   ( )   . Furthermore, suppose that 
the manager has observed a positive signal. The portfolio weight that maximizes 
expected return is then   .  We must have the following expression for a 
successful implementation of a leverage strategy: 
 ( )  (    )       
And then return under shorting is 
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 ( )  (    )       
We must show that there is an interior solution to   which gives the portfolio 
return    under the assumption of a realization of   . Hence we set: 
(   )       (    )        
Rearranging  
  
     
     
   
Since the condition that a maximum leverage strategy gives the potential highest 
return is: 
    
     
 
 (1.27)  
This condition implies that  
     
     
   
Thus showing duplication requires an interior solution. 
Finally, this is sufficient since varying    will not influence probability of receiving 
 ( ) 
  
A4 Proof of proposition 4 
Let     
    and    
    . Since the optimal response to any signal for the 
investor is to adopt an extreme short or leverage strategy, the optimal contract 
must provide the agent with the incentives of choosing this over any other 
weights. The investor must try to ensure that the agent never chooses to invest 
in the safe asset without shorting the risky asset, so without loss of generality we 
assume he rationally sets ( )   . This, along with the result that all interior 
solutions are suboptimal and binding the participation constraint implies the 
following expression for expected utility for the manager. 
   ( )     ( )     
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To satisfy the incentive constraint w.r.t portfolio selection, it is sufficient to 
promise a positive utility in the desired states. Hence, it is satisfied for ( )    
and (  )   . For any value of W, they must satisfy the following limits: 
   
 (  )  
 ( )  
  
  
 
   
 ( )  
 ( )  
  
  
 
 To find all values of these transfers that are optimal for the investor, we 
introduce the parameter   to represent the relative weight on the leverage 
strategy and see this satisfy the participation constraint for   ,   -. 
     
  
 
    (   )
  
    
This shows that the investor can vary the payments in the desired states to 
satisfy both the participation and the portfolio selection constraint. But, the only 
requirement ensuring optimal portfolio selection is that the desired states yield 
strictly more transfers than any other state. Hence it can also be optimal to pay a 
small bonus when reaching the desired states and vary the fixed fee such that 
participation is ensured. If we let   be the weight put on the fixed part of the 
compensation we end up with the expression in the proposition. We also see 
that the participation constraint is binding: 
    (   ) *
     
  
 
    (   )
  
+     
Finally, we attempt to identify restrictions on  . Assume now that (    )   
     represent the upper bound of portfolio return. According to proposition 3 
this implies that optimal portfolio selection requires that transfers at this node is 
strictly larger than any other possible realization. Since this represents a 
successful leverage strategy, we can write: 
   
  
 
(   )  
  
 
Rewriting this gives: 
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Since the opposite must be true if short-selling gives the potential highest return, 
this condition will simply reverse.  
  
 
A5 Proof of proposition 5 
We can no longer assume a binding participation constraint, but optimality 
requires that we set the payment in the lowest possible return to 0, hence 
 ( ( ))    
With this condition we can check that binding the truth telling constraints solves 
the max problem for the investor. First they must be increasing in return as was 
assumed under optimal portfolio. The condition is that 
 ( ( ))   ( ( ))   ( )   ( (  )) 
It is easily verifiable that this must hold considering the payments are made as a 
markup on the potential stolen returns for the agent. If the truth telling 
conditions are to bind will depend on the size of the manager’s reservation 
utility. Let the compensation scheme under binding truth telling conditions be  . 
If we define the difference in expected utilities gained for the agent under   and 
   as:        ( | )  We see that, as in the first best case, a fixed transfer 
can be added to the contract to ensure participation.  
Proposition 4 implies that if    is positive, the first best will be implemented and 
the manager is left with an expected utility equal to his reservation utility. 
However, if this is strictly negative, the investor must promise the manager rent 
to ensure that he reports truthfully.   
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A6 Proof of theorem 1 
We attempt to show the condition at which it is possible to construct a contract 
that will be accepted by the good agent, but disregarded by the poor. Stremme 
(2001 theorem 5.2 p26) shows that in a dynamic setting and under the 
assumption of no short selling or leverage, this condition boils down to a simple 
constraint on the reservation utilities    (   
 )  . Simple calculations show 
that this also holds under the static situation. Our situation changes these 
conditions as we will show, giving the investor a unique state of which he can 
satisfy the participation of the high guy. 
First we make some important observations. By reducing the payment promised 
in the 0 state, the investor gains flexibility when binding the participation 
constraint of the high type. To see this, consider the case when  ( )   . For 
the low type, this implies that  ( )  (    
  ( ))   ⁄ . We know that for 
any  ( ) we must have that  ( )   ( ) to ensure optimal portfolio 
selection. Thus, the investor wants to reduce ( ) as much as possible. 
Case 1: Mimicking the leverage strategy 
First, for the good managers to accept and the bad to decline contract the 
following two conditions must hold: 
 
   ( )  (    ) ( )     ( )     ( )
    
(1.1)  
    ( )  (    ) ( )     ( )     (1.2)  
We then have 
 
   ( )  (    ) ( )     ( )
     
  ( )     
(1.3)  
Next, we must check the conditions on ( ) that implies participation only for 
the high type. Suppose optimal portfolio selection is satisfied. In proposition 3 
we show that only the largest possible return matters when defining a floor of 
payments. That is, if optimal leverage constitutes the strategy with the potential 
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highest return, then transfers in any other state cannot be larger than this. 
Hence, we have the wage at  ( ) must satisfy two conditions: 
  ( )  {
 ( )         
   ( )
  
        
 (1.4)  
These are the conditions for optimal portfolio selection and leverage strategy for 
the low type. Let’s now consider the case where      . Then we can rewrite 
(1.11) to: 
       
  ( )    (  
  
  
* 
Hence, the condition for screening is: 
      (  
  
  
* (1.5)  
Now, consider the case where      .  Now 1.11 instead rewrites to: 
       
  ( )      
And we end up with the condition: 
        (1.6)  
 
Case 2: Mimicking the short sale strategy 
We now attempt to verify that these conditions also hold when the bad manager 
commits to a short sale strategy. Using the same calculations as in the first case 
we rewrite (1.11) to: 
 
   ( )  (    ) ( )     ( )
     
  ( )     
(1.7)  
Similarly, (??) becomes: 
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  ( )  {
 ( )         
   ( )
  
        
 (1.8)  
We then end up with the conditions: 
 
           
    
     (  
  
  
)         
 (1.9)  
  
 
A7 Proof of Proposition 6 
Conversely to the case where returns were observable, all returns in the support 
except the lower bound must be strictly positive. This means we can write the 
condition for non-active management for the bad agent as: 
    ( )  (    ) ( )    ( ( )   ( ))     (1.1)  
And the participation condition for the high type is: 
    ( )  (    ) ( )    ( ( )   ( ))     (1.2)  
This in turn implies that: 
    
  ( )      
  ( ) 
Rewriting: 
      ( ( )   ( )) where          (1.3)  
Now we can solve for the monetary value the signal has for the high guy using 
the minimum payments required to ensure truthful reporting remembering that 
the investor could potentially push ( ) as high as marginally below ( ), but 
this will again be pinned down by the participation constraint of the low type. To 
characterize the feasible space we can first use definition 3 and bind truth telling 
to the states ( ) and ( ). This and the participation constraint for the low 
type imply: 
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   (   
 )(   )(     )  
  
 
  (   )(     )  
  
 
(1.4)  
Moreover we have 
 
    ( )   ( )
 
  
  
 
  (   )
  
((     )(     )  
 (     )) 
 
(1.5)  
Since    ( )      ( )   ( ) we can combine (1.3) and (1.5) and have 
our result.  
  
A8 Proof of Proposition 7 
Denote  ,   - the expected gross portfolio return under first best management 
and  ,   - gross portfolio return under management by a bad manager. Then 
for any strategy, the bad managers return with delegation is  ,   -    . Hence, 
the investor is left with:  ,   -  (   )( ,   -      )     
 [ (      )]  (   ) . For active management on the other hand, the 
investor is left with:  [    (   )( ,   -   )]. Taking the difference 
between these two expressions we get:  .    (      )/. Rewriting and we 
have our result 
  
A9 Proof of Theorem 2 
Proof: First we notice that     [(     )(   )]. Also let    be the 
payment to the jth manager. We can the write the expected return generated by 
the first manager as: 
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 [  (      )  (    ) (  (         )
 (    ) (  (            )    (    )(  (   
   
 ∑  
 
   
))]  
Next, we attempt to find expressions for all W. Consider a bad manager who has 
delegated his portfolio to another bad manager who then reaches a good 
manager. First the good manager needs to be compensated leaving  (   )   
  , then the second bad manager needs to be compensated: ( (   )     
 )(   ). But this is the same as   (  )(   )      
If there was another manager also needed compensation this would simply be: 
 (            )(   )       
And another 
 (                 )(   )       
We can now rewrite the series to: 
  ( (   )    )  (    )(  ( (   )        )
 (    ) (  ( (   )             )    (    )(  ( (   )
    ∑    
 
   
)) 
We notice that    must be paid with certainty, hence we can take  (   )  
   out of the series. Moreover, the other part can be written as: 
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 ∑(    )     
 
   
) 
Using rules for geometric series, we see that each of these terms can be written 
as geometrical series. Thus we can write this as: 
 (
(    )   
  (    ) 
 
(    )     
  (    )  
   
(    )     
  (    )  
) 
We see this can be written: 
 
(    )   
  (    ) 
(  (    )  .(    ) /
 
 .(    ) /
 
* 
Using the rules for a geometric series once more we arrive at our K. that is  
   (   )     
(    )   
(  (    ) ) 
 
For the rest of the theorem we subtract the expected utility when delegating 
from expected utility from self-managing and find our result 
   ,   - 
  
A 10 Preliminary Thesis Report 
1.0 Introduction 
In economics we are often concerned with how information asymmetries will 
affect the outcome of some fiduciary relationship between two or more parties. 
If the objects of all parties were the same, there would be no inefficiencies and 
no formalization of the agreement will be needed. However, this is often not the 
case. A worker will have objectives that do not correspond to the objectives of 
the company, a manager of a mutual fund will want to maximize his own 
payment or an insured agent may take action he would not otherwise take if not 
protected. It is not difficult to see that examples like this could be found in all 
aspects of the economy. If the objectives between the players differ, the 
principal could propose a contract which would protect his interest such that the 
Page | 95  
 
agent is given the incentives to take actions the principal would have done in the 
absence of the relationship (Laffont and Martimort 2001). Contract theory is a 
field of economics which is concerned with the design of such incentive 
compatible contract under various information structures (Bolton and 
Dewatripont 2005). A contract is an agreement between parties (individuals, 
businesses, organizations or government agencies) which may or may not be 
legally binding32 and involves a promise to do something in return for a valuable 
benefit (exchange of promises). The legal nature of the ‘Contract’ (‘Contract law’) 
is derived from the principle expressed in the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda, 
which literally means "pacts must be kept". Moreover, a contract specifies the 
terms and conditions under each parties commitment.  
In contract theory two important cases of information asymmetry are described. 
The first case is referred as ‘Adverse Selection’, where because some parties 
have more information than others regarding the state of the world, results in 
market inefficiency and possibly a full market breakdown. In an influential paper 
by Akerlof (1970), he shows that, using the market for used cars as an example, 
car owners with good quality cars will never put their car up for sale since the 
buyers are only willing to pay an amount equal to an estimate based on the 
distribution of quality (value). Thus reducing the amount the buyers are willing to 
pay for a car given that they only know the distribution. The idea is that this 
looped mechanism may then, in the worst case, lead to a market breakdown, or 
possibly, “a market for lemons”.  
The second case is known as ‘Moral Hazard’ which occurs when one party have 
private information the actions taken that would influence the fiduciary 
relationship. Examples of this may be a worker, which is costly to monitor for the 
employer, could work hard or shirk, or a manager of mutual fund could do 
thorough analytical work prior to his investments or he could more or less 
arbitrarily pick a portfolio matching his own risk profile.  These cases are often 
explained and analyzed in the literature using a Principal-Agent model, in which a 
principal that hires an agent to pursue his interests’ faces difficulties arising from 
asymmetric information and this problem is called ‘agency problem’ or ‘principal 
                                                          
32
 Reflecting the power of enforcement 
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agent problem’. There exists a large literature that discusses analytical properties 
of principal agent framework and provides us with an enlightening 
understanding of how optimal contracts are designed when faced with agency 
problem.  
2.0 Literature Review 
In our thesis, we will focus on the problem of moral hazard in the hedge fund 
industry, where the manager of the fund takes action which is hidden to the 
investor. Before we go more into the institutional setting, we present a general 
review of the theory of moral hazard (and to some extent adverse selection) in 
different contexts   
2.1 The Static Case 
Laffont and Martimort (2001) present a thorough description of the binomial 
case where effort and production can take on two values, high or low. In the 
basic model presented, the optimal rent extraction-efficiency trade-off faced by 
the principal when designing his contractual offer to the agent is characterized. 
They point out that in the case of adverse selection where an agent may get 
access to information which is not available to the principal when a task is 
delegated, in order to achieve efficiently, an incentive compatible contract must 
be prepared such that it entices the agent to share the private information. In 
the literature, this is referred as the “revelation principle”. The term first 
appeared in Baron and Myerson (1982), where the authors considered the 
problem of regulating a monopolist with cost unknown to the regulator. In their 
proposition they define the revelation principle as: 
Without any loss of generality, the regulator may be restricted to regulatory 
policies which require the firm to report its cost parameter θ and which give the 
firm no incentive to lie. 
In economics, the term moral hazard was first introduced by Pauly (1968), when 
considering the problem in the insurance industry, where he found that even if 
the agent is risk averse, it is not optimal to provide him with full insurance. The 
model was first formalized by (Zeckhauser 1969). In the same institutional setting 
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as Pauly, he presented the optimization problem of the individual. If we consider 
a more general setting, the problem of moral hazard can be formalized in both a 
continuous and a discrete way with respect to effort and output. In the standard 
model, output is made conditional on effort and the state of nature. Laffont and 
Martimort (2001) presents a general model under the assumption that effort and 
production can take on two values, i.e., high or low. Under these assumptions33 
they analyze various cases. First when the agent is protected by limited liability, 
they show that moral hazard is not a problem when the agent is risk neutral 
despite of the non-observability of effort. This is because the principal can 
choose incentive compatible transfers (high and low), which relaxes the agent's 
participation constraint and leave no rent to the agent. The Agent is rewarded 
when production is high and punished when the production is low. This is also in 
line with Biais (2009a).  The principal who is also risk neutral makes an expected 
payment which is equal to the disutility of effort for the agent. This simple case 
implies that delegation will be costless to the principal. In the literature this is 
referred as First Best Cost. 
Another important case is when the risk neutral agent has limited liability. This 
deduces the optimal contract to the point that the delegation will no longer be 
costless to the principal, because agent is now only liable to some extent and 
agent has to be given transfers greater than some exogenous level which implies 
that agent has limited liability. If this exogenous given level is smaller than the 
optimal transfers given some realization of nature, the agent must be provided 
positive limited liability rent. This means that cost of the effort will be the second 
best cost to the principal (higher than first best cost).  The same holds in case of 
when the agent is risk averse. Here, because the agent is risk averse and the 
optimal transfers would entail that the agent has to be paid a risk premium to 
induce participation.  Therefore the delegation would again be costlier than first 
best cost, which will increase with the degree of risk aversion.  
This analysis are made in a binary world, but could easily be extended to allowing 
for continuous effort or production. If however effort is defined continuously, 
then solving the program of the principal becomes very involved as it must be 
                                                          
33
 They also expand, allowing for more effort or production levels 
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solved with respect to an infinite number of incentive constraints. Laffont and 
Martimort (2001) consider such a model where the production is defined over a 
closed interval with a distribution and density conditioned on effort equal to 
 ( | ) and  ( | ) respectfully. The infinitely many incentive constraints are the 
replaced with the first order condition. This approach was criticized by Mirrles 
(2009), by the difficulty of proving global maxima of expected utility when 
employing the first order approach.  However Jewitt (1988) presented a 
procedure for validating this methodology. The first step is to ensure that the 
multiplier on the incentive constraint is positive, secondly, ensure that the utility 
of the agent falls within a known class, and finally, make sure that the utility 
function of the agent is concave. 
2.2 The dynamic case 
In the dynamic case of moral hazard, the payoff to the agent could be made 
conditional on past performance. Biais (2009a) and Laffont and Martimort 
(2001), presents similar, discrete time, two period models, In these models, 
incentive compatibility implies an increase in the expected utility of the agent 
after success and decrease after failure. Here the principal can take advantage of 
the dynamic nature of the relationship in order to relax the incentive constraints. 
For instance - the transfer promised at the second period after two successes is 
useful to entice effort at both first and second period. Moreover, Biais allows for 
scaling of the project between the periods, and finds that closing the firm at the 
second period if production is low in the first period can help avoiding full market 
breakdown. The intuition is that the agent rationally expects the project to be 
liquidated (or the investor exercising his walkaway option in the case of money 
management) when the project performs poorly. While such liquidation is good 
to provide the agent with incentives, it hurts efficiency. Therefore, by introducing 
this extension to the model it still reflects the rent/efficiency tradeoff. Moreover, 
if the old manager can be replaced, Biases postulates that the principal needs to 
weigh this alternative in relation to their current state and cost of finding a new 
manager.  
Under the discrete time infinite time horizon case the continuation expected 
utility of the agent and the value function of the principal are evaluated given the 
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information available at the beginning of period n. All the other assumptions are 
same as in one and two period case. Here, the continuation utility (CU) of the 
agent evolves as a function of the cash flow realizations. The idea is that 
following a negative (positive) realization of output, the continuation utility of 
the agent must be reduced (increased), such that the incentive compatibility 
holds.  Moreover, Biais (2009b) discusses that due to the sensitive nature of the 
continuation utility of the agent to the performance of the firm, incentive 
compatibility requires that this sensitivity be equal to the magnitude of the 
moral hazard problem (reflected by the agents outside option and his cost of 
effort). 
2.3 Allowing for more dimensions 
In all generality, effort can be thought of as a vector consisting of n choice 
variables, each with its own unique technology linking it to the returns or 
production. Some papers focus explicitly on this property. Livdan and Tchistyi 
(2010), investigates a contract where owner of a financial institution/investor 
tries to align manager’s objectives with his own. They consider a two 
dimensional moral hazard problem in which risk neutral manager privately 
chooses the risk of the investments and his binominal effort level. Both these 
actions are unobservable to the principle. In the model, a high risk project 
increases the probability of a high cash flow realization, but it also results in 
significant losses in a bad state of nature, which is referred to as the “disaster" 
state.   
In this model, the incentive compatible contract must reward the agent for 
reporting the high cash flow, otherwise the agent would just report low returns 
and steal the difference. However, conditioning the agent's reward on the 
reported cash flows also creates an incentive for the agent to take the high-risk 
project. The reason for that is that the agent benefits from the high cash flow 
and is protected by the limited liability in the “disaster" state. The contract that 
induces the agent to choose the low-risk project without stealing cash flows 
requires significant payoffs for the agent for the “non-disaster" outcomes. Finally 
the authors find that if it is impossible to write a contract conditional on the 
state of nature, it may be optimal to increase the investments. An increase in the 
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project size should be used as a reward for the manager for high cash flow 
realizations.  
2.4 Applications 
The principal agent model can be used to study a wide selection of markets in 
the economy. We will now present some of the most famous applications of the 
methodology. 
2.4.1 Credit rationing 
This phenomenon refers to a situation where lenders limit the supply of 
additional credit to borrowers, even if the borrowers are willing to pay higher 
interest rates. Tirole (2006) uses a principal agent model to explain credit 
rationing, with a focus on moral hazard. A common idea is that an increase in the 
interest rate has no effect on the borrower in the event of bankruptcy since he is 
protected by the limited liability. A higher interest rate would mean a lower 
stake for the borrower, since he now has to pay more than the normal rate to 
get access to certain amount of money. This reduced stake motivates the 
borrower to pursue projects with high private benefits, which in turn may reduce 
the probability of the reimbursement. Another way to look at the problem, and 
more in line with an adverse selection argument, is that higher interest rates 
tend to attract low quality borrowers and since these low-quality borrowers are 
more likely to default on their loan, they are less affected by a rise in the interest 
rate than high quality borrowers. Therefore to keep a good sample of borrowers, 
lenders may want to keep the interest rates low. 
 
Tirole studies the phenomena in a simple agency model and uses it to illustrate 
the role of net worth. In this model, an “entrepreneur” does not have enough 
money to finance a fixed-size project and must therefore resort to outside 
funding. The entrepreneur controls his effort level and may also chose between 
projects with different probability of success. Both players are assumed risk 
neutral, but due to the competitive nature of the market, the lenders make zero 
profits. This assumption will act as a constraint in the maximization problem of 
the lender. Finally, the borrower who is protected by limited liability is ensured 
non negative transfers from the relationship. Tirole shows under which 
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conditions the entrepreneur receives and, if so, how the profit is shared between 
the lenders and the borrower.  
Due the zero profit condition of the investors, when project is funded borrower 
receives the entire surplus if the project is funded. Tirole show that a necessary 
condition to receive financing is that the break even constraint holds. This 
constraint say that if the entrepreneurs own stake in the project is less than 
some limit dependent on the severity of the moral hazard problem, the 
probability of high return and the required lending, the lender cannot afford to 
incentives the agent to exert high effort (which is assumed to be the only case 
where it is possible to get financing in the first place). Thus, he will not receive 
financing  
2.4.2 Investor-manager relationships 
The principal agent framework has also been prominent in the hedge fund 
literature when analyzing the effect of managerial effort on returns. Kouwenberg 
and Ziemba (2007) presents a theoretical study of how incentives affect hedge 
fund risk and returns and compare their findings to empirical data. In their paper, 
they model the behavior of a representative hedge fund manager and derived an 
optimal investment strategy under the assumption of an option like 
compensation scheme. Doing this they find that performance fees, which 
originally provides the manager with the incentives to boost returns, also 
increases his risk appetite. The same notion is also shared by investment experts 
such as Warren Buffet, who believes that hedge funds shares only profits but not 
losses. 
 In their empirical analysis Kouwenberg & Ziemba show that hedge funds with 
performance fees have lower mean returns and worse risk-adjusted 
performance. Their results do not indicate increased volatility in hedge funds 
employing performance fees, but they do find significant results when focusing 
on the downside risk and not volatility, indicating increased risk appetite. Finally, 
they find out that fund of funds that charge higher performance fee are more 
risky and have higher average returns, indicating that the manager’s responds to 
the performance fee by allowing more risk. This need not imply that these 
managers are more skillful, since this does not explain why managers with high 
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(if that’s true), have more risky returns on average. If skill is a indeed factor in 
earning better returns, then high performing managers should also be able to do 
so with less risky investments as well. 
3.0 The Institutional Setting 
Hedge funds are open ended investment vehicles that pursue strategies that 
deliver absolute return regardless of market turbulence. Moreover, hedge funds 
differ from mutual funds and other investment vehicles by employing more 
sophisticated investment strategies and by being subject to a more liberal 
regulatory environment allowing them to hold both short and long positions, and 
to leverage their investments (Strömqvist 2009). Furthermore, hedge funds often 
have a high minimum investment and target institutional investors as well as 
wealthy individuals.  
Traditionally hedge funds have remained robust through periods of financial 
instability compared to other investment vehicles (Strömqvist 2009), but the 
recent financial crisis hit the hedge fund industry hard and many funds still 
struggle to reach their pre-crisis watermark, although most (57%) surpassed the 
watermark during 2010 (Suisse 2011). Nevertheless, the rapid growth in many 
countries superannuation may ensure the industry a steady flow of funds in the 
years to come. In fact, the number of pension funds investing in hedge funds has 
increased by 50% since 2007 (Preqin 2011). 
Many questions have been raised in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Critics have claimed that the industry’s use of leverage and short positions 
enhanced the volatility in the markets. These are however, by no means new to 
the industry, which faced similar accusations in the 90s crisis. Others marginalise 
the industry’s potential to influence the financial markets in a crisis situation and 
argue that hedge funds where greatly negatively affected by the crisis, and the 
fact that short selling was temporary banned during the crisis (Strömqvist 2009). 
Moreover, Hasan et al. (2009) finds support for their hypothesis that short selling 
is more profound for financial institutions with greater exposure to the subprime 
market, indicating that banning short selling may reduce the disciplining effect 
on investors holding risky subprime assets.  
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More interesting is the industry’s new focus on the remuneration system, and 
particularly on the HWM structure, where the traditional 2%/20% structure34 
has received much attention both by academics and practitioners. Zhan (2010) 
proposes that it may be in the in the best interest of the investor to reset the 
watermark in order to provide the manager with the right incentives following a 
period with large losses, while Richard Beales35 are more concerned about the 
industry’s ability to attract the best managers by relying solely on the 
management fee until the industry is out of the waters. He claims that the 
financial crisis has highlighted the need for a reform of the fee structures 
commonly applied by the industry. One solution according to Beales is to make 
incentives depended on several periods of performance and to stop payments of 
illiquid gains. This is also in line with Biais et al. (2010), where they find that in a 
dynamic moral hazard situation, compensation to the agent should be based on 
long term track record.    
Another possible solution presented by Beales is to introduce a lone pine model. 
In this compensation structure, the incentive fee is not reduced to zero following 
a loss, but the manager receives only half the rate when recovering out of the 
waters. He receives this reduced fee until he has recovered 150% of the loss. 
Thus, fees paid by the investor are reduced as well as the volatility in fees 
received by the manager. A contract based on this can at the end of any given 
period be described as:  
   {
 (    (     )      )  ⁄                 (    )      
 (    (    )      )  ⁄                 (    )       
        
 
First note that     in this example (it could easily be included, but we leave it 
out for now to maintain the focus on the more interesting performance fee). 
Moreover,      is the AuM at the beginning of the period,    is the realised 
return of period t,      is the mark that needs to be reached in order to collect 
full fees. When the value of the fund surpasses this level, the manager starts 
collecting his usual fee   again. 
                                                          
34
 This structure implies a  usually annual fee on the assets under management of 2% and an 
asymmetric incentive fee of 20% on the returns 
35
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/16/markets/hedge_funds_above_water.breakingviews/index.htm 
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3.0 Motivation 
3.1 Moral hazard and the hedge fund industry 
In general, investors delegating the management of their assets to an agent 
cause frictions due to the different object functions of the investor and the 
manager. The manager, will privately make decisions which may not be in the 
best interest of the investor. There are several factors which may help mitigate 
these frictions and (Ackermann, Mcenally, and Ravenscraft 1999) identify four 
such factors in the investor manager relationship.  
The first factor is the contract. That is, the contract can be designed such that the 
manager is given the incentives to make effort and risk decisions that are optimal 
for the investor. The problem for the investor is that if he cannot observe the 
effort or risk choices of the manager. If the agent is risk averse or protected by 
limited liability and he cannot directly dictate the effort or risk level in the 
contract, the first best cannot be reached. The investor will instead have to settle 
for the second best, implying a positive expected rent to the manager36. 
Ownership structure may also help mitigate the problem of moral hazard. Often, 
especially in hedge funds, managers have substantial investments in their own 
fund. This joint ownership structure exposes the manager to the same risks as 
the investors and thus helps align the objects of the investors and managers. 
However, as pointed out by Ackermann, Mcenally, and Ravenscraft (1999), given 
a risk averse manager, he may end up choosing a risk level below that is 
preferred by the investors. Moreover, Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) show that 
risk taking by the manager is greatly reduced if the manager has a substantial 
investment of his own wealth into his own fund (at least 30%). 
Thirdly, government regulation may put restrictions on the extent at which the 
managers may adopt certain risky strategies, lockup periods and investments 
criteria (such as allowing for smaller minimum investment). This is less relevant 
for the hedge funds than the more regulated mutual funds industry. One 
argument often used to rationalize the minimal regulation facing hedge funds, is 
                                                          
36 If the manager could make effort and risk part of the contract he could extract all rent from the 
agent. 
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that investors of such investment vehicles are assumed to be more rational and 
informed than the average investor (considering the high minimum investment 
and the large degree of institutional clients), and thus does not need the same 
protection as for instance investors in mutual funds. Nevertheless, there has 
been increasing concern regarding the level of regulation in the industry, 
magnified by the financial crisis, where short selling in many financial institutions 
was temporarily banned in order to reduce the negative impact short selling can 
have in an already vulnerable sector.  
Finally, market forces may also help reduce the principal agent problem. The idea 
is that well informed, rational investors, will exit funds where effort or risk does 
not match their optimal preferences and invest in higher performing funds with 
better matching risk profiles. Obviously, these selection mechanisms scale with 
the degree of fund transparency. Thus, for hedge funds, especially with a joint 
ownership where replacing the manager may prove difficult, this effect is limited 
(Ackermann, Mcenally, and Ravenscraft 1999). 
3.2 The fee structure 
Hedge funds often employ a different compensation structure compared to 
other more heavily regulated investment vehicles such as mutual funds. A 
common practice in the industry has been to charge an annual management fee 
on the assets under management (usually 2%) and a performance fee on returns 
(usually 20%). Many hedge funds also use hurdle rates as part of their 
remuneration scheme. That is, incentive fees are only paid on returns excessing a 
benchmark such as the LIBOR plus some spread. Critics have claimed that an 
option like structure like described above gives the manager incentives to 
increase the volatility of the portfolio above what is preferred by the investor, 
and Starks (1987), finds by using an agency theoretic approach that a symmetric 
compensation structure dominates the option like structure in terms of aligning 
the desired risk level for the players, where the latter structure incentivizes the 
agent to choose risk level above what is optimal for the principal.  
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3.3 High water mark 
Another common characteristic of many hedge funds remuneration schemes is 
the use of a high water mark37. This implies that the manager needs to recover 
previous losses in order to keep collecting incentive fees38. If we consider a 
fictional fund X with initial investment €10,000. The chart below represents the 
simulated annual performance of fund X. The performance is modeled as a 
random walk. That is: 
               ,where    is i.i.d Gaussian white noise 
In this case, investments are made at the beginning of period 1 and the 
watermark is set at the initial value €10,000. At time 2, the value of the fund 
starts dropping and the HWM is set at the highest historical NAV, that is point a 
on the chart. Assuming an annual asymmetric compensation structure given by: 
        (     )
  
Where   is the management fee,   is the performance fee and V and h are the 
value of the fund and the watermark respectfully. Thus the manager is protected 
by limited liability ensuring positive transfers39. However, in order to collect 
performance fee once the value starts rising again, the value of the fund must 
exceed the watermark, a. At this point he will collect fee until the next turning 
point c, which again will be the new watermark. 
                                                          
37 Figures from CISDM 2008 shows that out of 872 respondents, 96% employed a watermark 
structure in their remuneration scheme (Ray and Chakraborty 2009) 
38 He will still collect his annual management fee on the total assets of the fund 
39 Alternatively we could assume a symmetric remuneration scheme where the agent would be 
directly punished from poor performance with negative transfers. 
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The watermark structure have been heavily debated in the literature, and Zhan 
(2010) shows by simulating a principal agent model over five and ten periods, 
that funds employing this compensation scheme significantly underperforms 
funds using a traditional asymmetric compensation structure. The reason 
according to Zhan is that following large losses, the cost of effort to the manager 
in order to reach the last watermark becomes large and the manager reduces his 
effort the next period, thus further increasing the distance to the watermark. 
Chakraborty and Ray (2008) found similar results when analyzing empirical data 
in order to predict the impact on the distance from the watermark on effort, 
walkaway option carried out by the investor and risk appetite of the manager. 
Using realized return as a proxy of the effort level of the manager they find 
evidence that increasing the distance to the watermark leads to lower effort, 
investors will more commonly exercise their walkaway option and managers are 
more likely to accept greater risks. 
4.0 The research questions and Methodological approach 
4.1 The research question(s) 
In order to analyze the investor-manager relationship in the hedge fund industry, 
we identify the following three research questions: 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
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1. How does the high watermark compensation structure influence the 
manager’s effort and risk choices? 
2. How does a high watermark contract influence a hedge funds ability to 
attract the best managers? 
3. What effect will alternative contract structures have on the managers 
effort and risk choices? 
4.2 The model 
We plan to analyze different hedge fund compensation structures using a 
principal agent model. To develop the model we begin in a simple static 
environment assuming that the investor have all the bargaining power and 
propose a take it or leave it offer to the manager. Given that the manager 
accepts the contract, he privately chooses whether and to what degree to exert 
effort and the volatility of the investments. Both these choice variables are 
private information and hidden to the investor who only can observe the realized 
reported return. Thus, there is moral hazard. Moreover, both the agent and 
principal are risk neutral, but the manager is protected by limited liability. That 
is, there exist some exogenous level limiting the extent at which the principal can 
contract negative payments from the agent (Laffont and Martimort 2001) (given 
by  (  )                                                         ). 
Finally, we will assume that both the principal and the agent can commit to the 
contract.  
The basic problem of the investor can be written in line with the standard 
method in the literature. That is, he will maximize his expected utility, subject to 
a participation constraint, which ensures the agent expected utility above his 
exogenous given reservation utility, and a set of incentive constraints, ensuring 
that the agent selects the appropriate level of effort and risk. If we allow effort to 
be continuous on a closed interval (i.e.   (   ), then we will necessary have 
to solve the program with infinitely many effort incentive constraints. Thus, a 
common practice in the literature is to replace the general constraint with its 
first order condition. Finally, the investor must optimize his object function 
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subject to a set of limited liability constraint, ensuring the manager transfers 
larger or equal to the exogenous level explained above.  
In order to capture the dynamic nature of the HWM contract, we plan to expand 
to a two period model. In this situation the choices of the manager in period one 
will affect his utility in period two. Moreover, it will allow us to analyze the effect 
of distance to the watermark on risk appetite and choice of effort and test for 
the robustness of the results obtained in the static situation. 
We also want to extend the model to capture different dynamics. If we allow for 
replacement of the manager after period 1, the expected compensation facing 
the new (if desirable) manager will be influenced by the funds past performance. 
That is, he may have to recover previous losses if the fund is below its watermark 
in order to collect performance fee. Furthermore, we can also allow for the 
manager to observe a binominal signal in addition to the reported return in line 
withLaffont and Martimort (2001). Here, the signal observed is dependent on the 
effort level (or risk choice) of the agent and provides the principal another source 
of information of which to condition his transfers. Another expansion is to allow 
the investor to scale down or up the investment (i.e. relax the assumption of a 
lock out period). In this case, the manager may scale down investments in order 
to provide the manager with additional incentives because he can threaten with 
downsizing if the fund performs poorly (Biais et al. 2010). Moreover, introducing 
a situation where the investor may increase his investment in period two could 
help incentivize the manager. The idea is that this new capital will have a new 
watermark reference, so the manager will in effect be able to collect 
performance fee on the return of this investment, even if the initial investment is 
below the watermark. Finally we may assume a joint ownership structure where 
the manager invests a substantial amount of his own wealth into the fund (as 
many funds require). Thus, his income will no longer depend solely on the fees 
he collect, but also on the appreciation (depreciation) of the fund’s assets. That 
is, his effort and risk decision will now also affect his equity stake.  
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5.0 Shortcomings of the methodology  
The principal agent framework rests on a set of assumptions which greatly 
reduces the technical difficulty of solving the model, but also limits the generality 
of the methodology. Laffont and Martimort (2001), identifies seven such 
assumptions in their comprehensive work “Theory of incentives”. Below follows 
a discussion of some of these assumptions, which we will include in our 
methodology: 
5.1 The ability to costless enforce contracts 
In the principal agent framework, a contract signed by the agent and the 
principal can be costless enforced by the principal, leaving no room for the agent 
to fail to carry out his commitment. If the optimal contract requires the agent to 
be punished for some realization of output, it could be in his best interest to 
renege on the agreement. This is however, not possible with the assumption of 
costless enforcing of the contractual agreement, since the principal could make 
use of the judicial system in order to force the agent to comply with his 
commitment. However, in reality we know that there are considerable costs 
related to run a case through the judicial system. Laffont and Martimort (2001) 
also highlight the need for the court system to be able to verify that the agent 
has violated the contractual agreement and the ability for enforce punishment. 
5.2 The assumption of full commitment by the agent and the principal 
This assumption states that we do not allow for renegotiation of the contract at 
the time when the agent has made his choices regarding effort and risk, and 
before the state of nature is revealed, even if such a renegotiation may be pareto 
improving (Stole 2001). Moreover, when considering an intertemporal model, 
the players can commit to the contract such that there will be no renegotiation 
of the contract between two periods, following the realization of some output. 
As argued by Laffont and Martimort (2001), Actions may be taken ex-post which 
will be beneficial for both players, but by allowing for such renegotiation, the 
agent will rationally anticipate this and take actions which will reduce the ex-
ante optimality.  
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5.3 All players are rational 
In the standard principal agent literature it is assumed that all players are 
rational utility maximizers. In reality, we observe that people may not act as 
predicted by the expected utility theorem when faced with choices under 
uncertainty. An alternative to this theorem was presented by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). In their paper entitled Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, They present a theory, where the standard utility function of the 
agent is replaced with a value function, representing the value of an outcome for 
the agent. The value function is assumed to be concave for monetary gains and 
convex for monetary losses. Furthermore, the probabilities are replaced by a 
decision weighting function which need not be the same as the probabilities (i.e. 
 ( )   , the agent will evaluate the probability in line with  the expected 
utility, but if this is not the case, expected utility will not hold). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
